The federal income-replacement programs overseen by the Social Security Administration (SSA), including Social Security Disability Insurance (DI), face rising enrollment and high costs that threaten solvency. DI-benefit rolls rose from 5 million in 2000 to 10.8 million in 2015; DI-benefit payments reached a peak of US$143.4 billion in 2015 (U.S. SSA, 2017). Such financial patterns have spurred keen interest in encouraging return to work. The DI-program rules offer a number of provisions for employment support, such as the Trial Work Period (TWP), that are intended as incentives for return to work. In addition, beneficiaries are eligible for SSA-paid employment services, such as through the Ticket to Work (TTW) program, in which beneficiaries could present their "tickets" for vocational services to qualified private providers or state vocational rehabilitation (VR) agencies. In spite of these provisions, return-to-work rates are low and rarely affect benefits. In 2014, benefits were withheld because of work for just below half of 1% of DI beneficiaries and terminated because of successful return to work at essentially the same rate (U.S. SSA, 2015). Estimates are somewhat higher (3.7%) in longitudinal studies (e.g., Liu & Stapleton, 2011). In contrast to DI-program rules and provisions, we focus on the service delivery process-on factors associated with the service delivery process, their relationships to employment outcomes, and achievement of earnings sufficient for successful departure from the benefit rolls. We examine a specific population of DI beneficiaries-consumers of state-federal VR services who are blind or visually impaired (BVI). We use multilevel modeling to identify individual characteristics, VR services, socioeconomic factors, and state-level characteristics that are associated with quality VR employment outcomes with substantial earnings that indicate the potential to leave the benefit rolls.