Return-to-Work Policies and Labor Supply in Disability Insurance Programs

Zaresani, Arezou

doi:10.1257/pandp.20181047

Cited by 7 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Campolieti and Riddell (2012) conclude that the introduction of an annual earnings disregard in Canada has substantial effects on LFP but no effects on DI entry or exit. Zaresani (2018); Zaresani et al (2021) find sizeable effects on labor supply and earnings of return-to-work policies comparing two Canadian provinces with different clawback regimes. Ruh and Staubli (2018) explore a relaxation of the earnings restrictions in Austria and find an increase in LFP among DI beneficiaries that is entirely offset by the increase in new claimants.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 97%

Disability insurance and the effects of return-to-work policies

Bianco

2023

Review of Economic Dynamics

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 97%

Disability insurance and the effects of return-to-work policies

Bianco

2023

Review of Economic Dynamics

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“…Gruber (2000), Campolieti (2004), Marie and Vall Castello (2012), Mullen and Staubli (2016), Eugster (2019), andFavre et al (2021) analyze the impact of changes in benefit generosity. Weathers and Hemmeter (2011), Campolieti and Riddell (2012), Kostøl and Mogstad (2014), Bütler et al (2015), Koning and van Sonsbeek (2017), Vall Castelló (2017), and Zaresani (2018; Ruh and Staubli (2019) analyze the impact of introducing return-to-work incentives for workers on benefits, and Koning (2009), Gradus (2013), andDe Groot andKoning (2016) analyze this for employers.…”

Section: Conflict Of Interest Statementmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Weathers and Hemmeter (2011), Campolieti and Riddell (2012), Kostøl and Mogstad (2014), Bütler et al. (2015), Koning and van Sonsbeek (2017), Vall Castelló (2017), and Zaresani (2018); Ruh and Staubli (2019) analyze the impact of introducing return‐to‐work incentives for workers on benefits, and Koning (2009), Van Sonsbeek and Gradus (2013), and De Groot and Koning (2016) analyze this for employers.…”

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confidence: 99%

The heterogeneous impact of stricter criteria for disability insurance

2023

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As the number of DI recipients grows in many Western countries, evidence on the impact of DI reforms on work resumption and benefit claims from DI and alternative social support programs are of utmost importance to policy makers. Figure 1 shows the number of people receiving DI benefits in 10 OECD countries during the period from 2007 to 2016. While many of the countries show an increasing trend over the observation period, in a small number of countries inflow into DI has decreased due to the major policy reforms implemented in these countries during the last 2 decades. Furthermore, during the period from 2007 to 2015, public spending on incapacity accounted, on average, for 2.06% of the gross domestic product in the OECD countries (OECD, 2018).Through DI reforms, governments introduced different types of measures to reduce the size of DI programs and promote labor participation among sick individuals. Autor and Duggan (2006) and Dal Bianco (2019) distinguish among three types of measures: stricter screening for disability during the sickness period and stricter eligibility criteria for DI so that fewer insured workers qualify, reducing benefit generosity so that incentives of insured workers to seek benefits are reduced, and introducing return-to-work incentives for workers on benefits and for employers. 1 Some of these studies rely on DI reforms to provide causal evidence on the impact of DI policies. With respect to screening for disability during the sickness period, Hullegie and Koning (2018) and Godard et al. (2022) analyze the effects of the Gatekeeper protocol introduced in the Netherlands in 2002, which made reintegration obligations of both employers and employees claiming sickness benefits concrete, making the screening process stricter. With respect to eligibility criteria,

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“…Hoynes and Mo tt (1999), Benitez-Silva et al (2011), Weathers II and Hemmeter (2011) and Bütler et al (2015) find no e ects from financial incentives to work in the US and Switzerland, and Ruh and Staubli (2019) find earnings threshold provides work disincentive in Austrian DI program. Meanwhile Zaresani (2018), Kostol and Mogstad (2014) and Campolieti and Riddell (2012) find positive responses respectively in Norway and Canada. Gelber et al (2017); Maestas et al (2013); Marie and Vall Castello (2012); Lemieux and Milligan (2008); Fortin et al (2004); Campolieti (2004) and Gruber (2000) find that providing more generous benefits has negative e ects on labor supply in social assistance programs in Canada, the US, and Spain.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%