Returns to Office in National and Local Politics: A Bootstrap Method and Evidence from Finland

Abstract

We estimate the private returns to being elected to parliament or to a municipal council using a regression discontinuity (RD) design. We first present a bootstrap method for measuring the closeness of elections, which can be applied to any electoral system. We then apply the method to perform an RD estimation in Finland, where seats are assigned according to a proportional open list system. Becoming a member of parliament increases annual earnings initially by about e20,000, and getting elected to a municipal council by about e1000. Subsequent earnings dynamics reveal that the returns to parliamentarians accrue mainly during the time in office, while the effect on later earnings is small. We also find a relatively weak individual incumbency advantage of 18 percentage points in parliamentary elections; the incumbency effect in municipal elections is negligible.

When does regression discontinuity design work? Evidence from random election outcomes

“…Third, we provide evidence that the local randomization approach advocated by Cattaneo, Frandsen, and Titiunik (2015) is also able to replicate the experimental estimate. Finally, our findings add to the cumulating evidence on limited personal incumbency advantage in proportional representation (PR) systems (see, e.g., Lundqvist (2013), Redmond and Regan (2015), Golden and Picci (2015), Dahlgaard (2016), and Kotakorpi, Poutvaara, and Terviö (2017)).…”

All the Single Ladies: Job Promotions and the Durability of Marriage

“…We conduct the analysis on a pooled sample of promotion winners and losers from different electoral ballots or municipal elections (following e.g. Eggers andHainmueller 2009, andKotakorpi, Poutvaara, andTerviö 2017), because two married women rarely appear as (close) contestants on the same ballot or municipal election.…”

Political Dynasties and the Incumbency Advantage in Party-Centered Environments

“…3 van Coppenolle (2017, pp. 21-22) conjectures that one reason for the null effect in historical U.K. elections (1837 to 1910) may be the fact that dynasties were more prolific in the U.K. than the U.S., so perhaps crowded out opportunities for new dynasties to form.4 A few studies, such asGolden and Picci (2015) andKotakorpi, Poutvaara and Terviö (2017), investigate the phenomenon in (open) list systems with preferential voting. Using parties as the unit of analysis (rather than candidates), Liang (2013) identifies a party incumbency advantage under closed-list PR in Swedish local elections.…”