2013
DOI: 10.3982/ecta10175
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Revealed Preference Tests of the Cournot Model

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to develop revealed preference tests for Cournot equilibrium. The tests are akin to the widely used revealed preference tests for consumption, but have to take into account the presence of strategic interaction in a game-theoretic setting. The tests take the form of linear programs, the solutions to which also allow us to recover cost information on the firms. To check that these nonparametric tests are sufficiently discriminating to reject real data, we apply them to the market for cr… Show more

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Cited by 53 publications
(44 citation statements)
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“…Clearly the agents (local decision Figure 9: The social learning region for the risk-aversion parameter α ∈ (0, 1]. It can be seen that the social learning region is absent when agents are sufficiently risk-averse and is larger when the stock value is known to change, i.e, P I. makers) and market observer interact -the local decisions a k taken by the agents determines the public belief π k and hence determines decision u k of the market observer via (35). Figure 10: The value function V(π) and the double threshold optimal policy µ * (π) are plotted over π (2).…”
Section: Nonconvex Stopping Set For Market Shock Detectionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Clearly the agents (local decision Figure 9: The social learning region for the risk-aversion parameter α ∈ (0, 1]. It can be seen that the social learning region is absent when agents are sufficiently risk-averse and is larger when the stock value is known to change, i.e, P I. makers) and market observer interact -the local decisions a k taken by the agents determines the public belief π k and hence determines decision u k of the market observer via (35). Figure 10: The value function V(π) and the double threshold optimal policy µ * (π) are plotted over π (2).…”
Section: Nonconvex Stopping Set For Market Shock Detectionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These include ARMA time series models [75], multivariate linear regression models [153], hidden Markov models [95], normal distribution fitting [60], and parametric model fitting [156,157]. Though all 34 YouTube website for helping with channels 35 This could also be due to the fact gaming videos account for 70% of the videos in the dataset. 36 We used a topic model to obtain the main tags.…”
Section: Social Sensor Engagement Dynamics With Youtube Videosmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…are, respectively, the correct (incest free) private belief for node n and the correct after-action public belief. If agent n does not use π 0 n− , then incest can propagate; for example if agent n naively uses (29).…”
Section: Data Incest Model and Social Influencementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Just as with the utility maximization budget constraint in (34), the budget constraint p t x i ≤ I i t in (38) models the total amount of resources available to the social sensor for selecting the response x i t to the external influence p t . The detection test for Nash rationality (Definition 4.2) has been used in [29] to detect if oil producing countries are collusive, and in [44] for the analysis of household consumption behaviour.…”
Section: 2mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This is always the first and, sometimes, the most important issue that a piece of RP analysis must resolve and it will have an impact on whether, and how, a model could be tested through a set of RP conditions. For example, in developing RP tests for an oligopoly model, one could imagine data being generated by changes to the demand functions, with firms' cost functions staying fixed in the observation period (as in Carvajal et al 2013), or the opposite, where demand functions are stable, while cost functions change and generate the data. What is reasonable depends on the context and the data that are, or are likely to be, available when implementing the test.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%