Abstract. We continue a line of research initiated in [10, 11] on privacypreserving statistical databases. Consider a trusted server that holds a database of sensitive information. Given a query function f mapping databases to reals, the so-called true answer is the result of applying f to the database. To protect privacy, the true answer is perturbed by the addition of random noise generated according to a carefully chosen distribution, and this response, the true answer plus noise, is returned to the user.Previous work focused on the case of noisy sums, in which f = i g(xi), where xi denotes the ith row of the database and g maps database rows to [0, 1]. We extend the study to general functions f , proving that privacy can be preserved by calibrating the standard deviation of the noise according to the sensitivity of the function f . Roughly speaking, this is the amount that any single argument to f can change its output. The new analysis shows that for several particular applications substantially less noise is needed than was previously understood to be the case.The first step is a very clean characterization of privacy in terms of indistinguishability of transcripts. Additionally, we obtain separation results showing the increased value of interactive sanitization mechanisms over non-interactive.