Revisiting European Influence: The Case of Agricultural Trade Negotiations

Scholars have long observed that states play off overlapping international institutions against one another in an effort to advance their policy objectives. This article identifies a strategy utilized by the EU in response to regime complexity that I term “backdoor bargaining.” Unlike forum-shopping, regime-shifting, and competitive-regime creation strategies, which states use to move multilateral negotiations to an institution that they expect will produce a more favorable outcome, backdoor bargaining involves a state using negotiations within one institution to gain an advantage in negotiations taking place at another distinct institution in a regime complex. I demonstrate the plausibility of backdoor bargaining by showing that the EU used the renegotiation of the Food Aid Convention as a strategy to gain bargaining leverage in the agriculture negotiations at the World Trade Organization. The article also offers insights into the potential consequences of international regime complexity for the EU as a global actor and the coherence of its foreign policies.

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Efficient Multilateralism or Bilateralism? The TTIP from an EU Trade Policy Perspective

García-Durán

Millet

2015

SSRN Journal

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Abstract:The EU bilateral trade strategy since 2006, including the TTIP, has been justified by the European Commission on the bases that deep and comprehensive trade agreements are compatible with efficient multilateralism. The Commission argument is the following: in a context marked by international supply-chains, preferential agreements that allow for progress on what has been achieved at the multilateral level (topics WTO +) and in areas not already covered by the WTO (items WTO-X) may be considered as a stepping stone, not a stumbling block for multilateral liberalization. In other words, EU recent bilateral negotiations and agreements should be seen at worst as complementary to multilateral negotiations and at best as promoters. This paper challenges this argument by pointing out that the multilateralization potential of a bilateral agreement may not be a sufficient condition for compatibility between the bilateral and multilateral approaches. Their complementarity may also be influenced by what is happening at the multilateral level. Content analysis of a primary source of information -the Bridges Weekly reports -shows that there has been a change in EU actions in the Doha Round towards Brazil, India and China since 2009. Though the EU did not preclude the inclusion of these emerging powers in the high table of negotiations at any time and was in favour of the Bali agreement of 2013, its willingness to respond to their demands reached a plateau in 2008. That may signal a change in the nature of its bilateral strategy. Indeed, from 2006 until 2009 the EU may have sought bilateral partners among new important trade players (India, ASEAN and South Korea) to complement or even facilitate a multilateral agreement. Since then, however, the EU may have focused on reaching agreements with even more important trade partners: the old Quad members (Canada, Japan and the USA) as a way to ensure the market access opportunities that it cannot longer expect to obtain from the Doha Round. Following this analysis, the TTIP should be read, at least in the short time, as an example of efficient bilateralism.. JEL Codes: F13, F53, N44.

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Revisiting European Influence: The Case of Agricultural Trade Negotiations

Cited by 3 publications

References 3 publications

What Underlies the Rhetoric in the Public Duel?

What Underlies the Rhetoric in the Public Duel?

Backdoor Bargaining: How the European Union Navigates the Food Aid Regime Complex

Efficient Multilateralism or Bilateralism? The TTIP from an EU Trade Policy Perspective

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