Revisiting Wittgenstein on Family Resemblance and Colour(s)

Abstract

We argue that all general concepts are family resemblance concepts. These include concepts introduced by ostension, such as colour(s). Concepts of colour and of each of the specific colours are family resemblance concepts because similarities concerning an open-ended range of colour or of appearance features crop up and disappear. After discussing the notion of "same colour" and Wittgenstein's use of the phrase "our colours", we suggest family resemblance concepts in one tradition can often be extended to family resemblance concepts in another tradition, illustrated by Wittgenstein's use of the words Spiel and "game".

Professional Knowledge, Expertise and Perceptual Ability

“…The orientation to the world and the concerns of other cultures can take forms that are unexpected and difficult for us to grasp. For example, it is natural to assume that the part of our conceptual scheme concerned with colour reflects a universal human orientation and that, although we can expect cultural variation according to interest (for example heightened discriminatory abilities and an associated vocabulary related to snow amongst peoples living in the High Arctic), we find it disorienting to have it suggested that perhaps concepts of colour do not exist or exist in a form substantially at variance to our own, as in the example given by Ma and van Brakel () of ancient Chinese oracle bone discourse, in which they argue that the perspective through which we should see what we call ‘colour concepts’ in that outlook is best approached through what they call ‘cattle–fur–appearance–discourse’ (CFAD) in which the prominence of ‘appearance features such as the smoothness of the animal fur, its dullness/brightness, its chromatic hue, its being variegated or not, showing patterns or not, its appearance at dawn and similar appearance features, as well as related evaluative features’ (pp. 274–275) are the appropriate way of interpreting a language game closely related to those associated with what we call ‘colour’.…”

“…Thus Ma and van Brakel () speculate that the CFAD discourse is predicated on the salience of mammals such as oxen and horses in a particular form of life.…”

Professional Knowledge, Expertise and Perceptual Ability

“…The orientation to the world and the concerns of other cultures can take forms that are unexpected and difficult for us to grasp. For example, it is natural to assume that the part of our conceptual scheme concerned with colour reflects a universal human orientation and that, although we can expect cultural variation according to interest (for example heightened discriminatory abilities and an associated vocabulary related to snow amongst peoples living in the High Arctic), we find it disorienting to have it suggested that perhaps concepts of colour do not exist or exist in a form substantially at variance to our own, as in the example given by Ma and van Brakel (2016) of ancient Chinese oracle bone discourse, in which they argue that the perspective through which we should see what we call colour concepts in that outlook is best approached through what they call 'cattlefurappearance -discourse' (CFAD) in which the prominence of "appearance features such as the smoothness of the animal fur, its dullness/brightness, its chromatic hue, its being variegated or not, showing patterns or not, its appearance at dawn and similar appearance features, as well as related evaluative features" (pp. 274-275) are the appropriate way of interpreting a language game closely related to those associated with what we call 'colour'.…”

Professional Knowledge, Expertise and Perceptual Ability

“…The orientation to the world and the concerns of other cultures can take forms that are unexpected and difficult for us to grasp. For example, it is natural to assume that the part of our conceptual scheme concerned with colour reflects a universal human orientation and that, although we can expect cultural variation according to interest (for example heightened discriminatory abilities and an associated vocabulary related to snow amongst peoples living in the High Arctic), we find it disorienting to have it suggested that perhaps concepts of colour do not exist or exist in a form substantially at variance to our own, as in the example given by Ma and van Brakel (2016) of ancient Chinese oracle bone discourse, in which they argue that the perspective through which we should see what we call 'colour concepts' in that outlook is best approached through what they call 'cattle-fur-appearancediscourse' (CFAD) in which the prominence of 'appearance features such as the smoothness of the animal fur, its dullness/brightness, its chromatic hue, its being variegated or not, showing patterns or not, its appearance at dawn and similar appearance features, as well as related evaluative features ' (pp. 274-275) are the appropriate way of interpreting a language game closely related to those associated with what we call 'colour'.…”