Revisiting the Memory‐Based Processing Approach to Common Ground

Abstract

Horton and Gerrig (2005a) outlined a memory-based processing model of conversational common ground that provided a description of how speakers could both strategically and automatically gain access to information about others through domain-general memory processes acting over ordinary memory traces. In this article, we revisit this account, reviewing empirical findings that address aspects of this memory-based model. In doing so, we also take the opportunity to clarify what we believe this approach implies about the cognitive psychology of common ground, and just as important, what it does not imply. We also highlight related areas of research demonstrating how general cognitive processes can constrain access to relevant knowledge in ways that shape both language production and comprehension.

Dynamically adapted context-specific hyper-articulation: Feedback from interlocutors affects speakers’ subsequent pronunciations

“…More generally, an adaptive speaker framework can accommodate the importance of communicative goals in understanding pronunciation variation (see also Brown-Schmidt & Tanenhaus, 2008; Fox Tree & Clark, 1997 Galati & Brennan, 2010; Jaeger, 2013; Kohler, 1990; Lindblom, 1990, among others; for review, see Jaeger & Buz, in press). Here, we have focused on adaptive or learning processes across productions, leaving open whether or not speakers continuously simulate the knowledge state of their interlocutors (see Brown-Schmidt et al, 2015; Horton & Gerrig, in press). Next, we discuss an alternative explanation of interlocutor feedback effects in terms of the dynamics of lexical planning.…”

“…More generally, research on language comprehension suggests that comprehenders store rich-context specific representations in memory (e.g., Brown-Schmidt et al, 2015; Goldinger, 1998; Horton & Gerrig, 2005; Johnson, 1997; Pickering & Garrod, 2013; Pierrehumbert, 2001; Wedel, 2006). For example, a growing body of evidence demonstrates that phonetic, lexical, syntactic and even higher level aspects of language usage depend not just on what is spoken but who spoke it and where (e.g., Arnold, Kam, & Tanenhaus, 2007; Hanulíková, Alphen, Goch, & Weber, 2012; Kleinschmidt & Jaeger, 2015; Kurumada, 2013; Niedzielski, 1999; Staum Casasanto, 2008; Strand, 1999; Walker & Hay, 2011; for positions and reviews, see Brown-Schmidt et al, 2015; Foulkes & Hay, 2015; Horton & Gerrig, in press; Weatherholtz & Jaeger, in press). Speakers might draw on this or similar implicit knowledge, which could be implemented in terms of situation-specific forward models (Jaeger & Ferreira, 2013).…”

A Mechanistic Framework for Explaining Audience Design in Language Production

“…This effect can be seen as feedforward audience design: The status of the addressee as previous or new is available to the speaker before production is initiated, and so feedforward mechanisms can implement a strategy whereby historical precedents are maintained with previous addressees, but that such precedents are broken with new addressees (and see Lockridge & Brennan, 2003 for evidence that comprehenders are sensitive to whether speakers maintain or break such precedents). Horton and Gerrig (2005; see also Horton & Gerrig, 2016) implemented a director-matcher paradigm, wherein a participant acting as director described pictures to be picked out by one of two participants (at different times across the task) acting as matchers. For half of directors, the types of pictures to be described aligned with matcher identity, such that directors described birds and dogs to one matcher but fish and frogs to the other.…”

Talker-specificity and adaptation in quantifier interpretation

“…(Similar reasoning applies to Bayesian models of adaptation that assume generative processes over hierarchically organized indexical alignment, Kleinschmidt & Jaeger, 2015.) Similarly, memory-based models of lexical alignment (Horton & Gerrig, 2005, 2015) can in theory account for both talker-specific expectations –if talkers are included as contexts (Brown-Schmidt, Yoon, & Ryskin, 2015). …”