Revisiting the rise and fall of the Somali Armed Forces, 1960–2012

The Ethnic Stacking in Africa Dataset: When leaders use ascriptive identity to build military loyalty

“…Even where autocrats fall, ethnically stacked armies systematically block democratization efforts, as their fate and continued access to military power and patronage is tied to the continuing rule of a coethnic leader (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Harkness, 2016, 2018). Excluding ethnic groups from such an important state institution as the military could also inspire mass unrest, from protests and riots to insurgency and terrorism, mirroring findings on how exclusion from executive power motivates ethnic rebellion (Cederman et al, 2010; Cederman et al, 2013; Roessler, 2011, 2016; Wimmer et al, 2009). Furthermore, ethnically and racially loyal security forces behave differently toward protestors and rebels hailing from out-groups, shaping human rights practices, surveillance, repression, and other repertoires of state violence.…”

“…For example, sub-groups of the Fang in Gabon have been recruited differentially into the security forces with the Estuary Fang favored in the Gendarmerie under Leon Mba (Decalo, 1998: 133). Clan identities have routinely structured military recruitment in Somalia, with the current national army drawn predominantly from three sub-clans of the Hawiye (Robinson, 2016). Region has shaped ethnic stacking in many Sahelian states where important north-south divides overlap ethnic, religious, linguistic, and racial cleavages.…”

“…Ethnic power sharing—or the accommodation of ethnic strongmen into central executive institutions and patronage structures—coopts groups and enhances the state's intelligence capacity to thwart mass uprisings. However, it simultaneously increases the threat capabilities of rival ethnic elites, who can now seize power from the inside (Roessler, 2016: 16–20, 96–99).…”