2010
DOI: 10.1007/s11038-010-9354-3
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Revolution in Field Science: Apollo Approach to Inaccessible Surface Exploration

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Cited by 5 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…However, the Apollo mission objectives were fairly geological in nature as at the time of the missions, relatively little was known about the lunar surface and astronauts were tasked with creating a baseline level of contextual knowledge (Clark, 2010). Although revolutionary in the inclusion of communication with a backroom of science (geology) experts on the Earth, the Apollo missions were strictly scheduled, leaving little room for exploration and the SWG had little opportunity to alter the EVA in response to any scientific discoveries.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, the Apollo mission objectives were fairly geological in nature as at the time of the missions, relatively little was known about the lunar surface and astronauts were tasked with creating a baseline level of contextual knowledge (Clark, 2010). Although revolutionary in the inclusion of communication with a backroom of science (geology) experts on the Earth, the Apollo missions were strictly scheduled, leaving little room for exploration and the SWG had little opportunity to alter the EVA in response to any scientific discoveries.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, once they had collected that information, it was much more useful for them to place candidate markers at any potential sample location, rather than trying to threshold their quality during the EVA. This contrasts with the methodology used by astronauts in Apollo, where it was the astronauts that had the final say in whether to sample or not (Clark, 2010). In fact, there were some cases where discussions between the EV and IV crew about whether or not to place a candidate marker created confusion in the MSC.…”
Section: Results and Analysismentioning
confidence: 94%
“…The operational and decision-making structure used by the BASALT program has been developed over time from a range of experiences including the Apollo missions, various Mars rover missions, and a number of analog studies in terrestrial and aquatic environments (Clark, 2010; Lim et al, 2011; Bleacher et al, 2013; Eppler et al, 2013; Yingst et al, 2013; Beaton et al, 2017). While top-level scientific priorities are made by the Mars-based crew and Earth-based support personnel in concert during the planning stages, the communication latency introduced in a Mars mission dramatically shifts the decision-making process during EVA execution from what has previously been used in terrestrial, lunar, or robotic Mars missions.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Historically, a team dedicated to intra-EVA science support has been important to the success of human exploration. During the Apollo program (1961–1972), the Field Geology Experiment Support Room (Eppler, 2013), provided tactical (decisions made in the context of a single EVA) strategic (decisions made in the context of overall mission objectives) expertise to the crew during EVAs and ensured scientific information was rapidly disseminated out to the wider community (Connors et al, 1994; Schaber, 2005; Clark, 2010). As a consequence of its success, several analog programs looking toward NASA's plans for a human mission to Mars (Drake et al, 2010; Craig et al, 2015) have attempted to integrate ground-based intra-EVA science support teams into their mission architectures.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%