Revolutionary Expressivism

Abstract

While the meta-ethical error theory has been of philosophical interest for some time now, only recently a debate has emerged about the question what is to be done if the error theory turns out to be true. This paper argues for a novel answer to this question, namely revolutionary expressivism: if the error theory is true, we should become expressivists. Additionally, the paper explores certain important but largely ignored methodological issues that arise for reforming definitions generally and with a vengeance in the context of a radical error theory about all practical normative judgements, and suggests how these issues can be resolved.

Moral Skepticism, Fictionalism, and Insulation

“…The moral abolitionist's stance, too, is incompatible with moral insulation: if one can and should abolish morality, then it is not the case that first-order moral beliefs are logically, epistemically, or psychologically insulated from moral skepticism. Note also that moral skeptics who adopted propagandism (on which see notes 9 and 12) or what has recently been called "revolutionary expressivism" (Köhler & Ridge 2013) would not be insulators either. The propagandist would not try to keep the truth of moral skepticism from the general public if he thought that first-order moral beliefs are unaffected by it.…”

If Nothing Matters

“…Köhler and Ridge () aim to find a way around this by setting out a purely motivational route from belief in nihilism to revolutionary antirealism. They argue that evaluative discourse has a function—namely that of playing “a regulative role for our behavior and emotional economy” (433), for example by guiding decision‐making and increasing coherence.…”