Revolutions and the Military: Endgame Coups, Instability, and Prospects for Democracy

Kohler, Kristopher; Albrecht, Holger

doi:10.1177/0095327x19881747

Cited by 30 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 66 publications

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“…Also, the issue of uncertainty leads dictators to make uninformed decisions. Dictators who consider the repression of large‐scale protests have incomplete information about their situation (Koehler & Albrecht, 2021, p. 152; Pierskalla, 2010; Tolstrup et al, 2019). Even if they order the military to suppress the protests, they are not necessarily certain whether it will cause protests to intensify, whether the international community will condemn it, or whether the military will disobey them and stage a coup .…”

Section: Theory Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The dictator's endgame is defined as “a situation where political incumbents are challenged by mass protest and the military turns into the ultimate guardian of the survival of a political leader” (Croissant et al, 2018, p. 194). In the endgame, popular mass uprisings create insecurity and shorten horizons in the decision‐making process of any agent in the state apparatus, greatly differing from any usual situation (Koehler & Albrecht, 2021, p. 151). A dictator is extremely vulnerable in this situation.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Losing power safely: Explaining the variation in dictators' responses to anti‐regime protests

et al. 2022

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This study aims to understand a dictator's response to large‐scale anti‐regime protests regarding their safety. While dictators tend to order the repression of such protests, in some cases, they voluntarily cede power without such repression. Earlier studies based on the assumption that leaders always act to maintain power cannot explain this variation. This article presents a novel claim that dictators choose the way in which they lose power. It argues that since dictators who lose power by coups suffer a worse fate than those who lose power following protests, they prefer to relinquish power by the latter if they anticipate that repressing dissent will result in a coup. Thus, dictators prefer a safer way of losing power over maintaining their office at all costs. Data on the post‐tenure fate of dictators from 1946 to 2010 and the case of South Korean anti‐regime protests in 1987 support this theory. Related Articles Hellmeier, Sebastian. 2016. “The Dictator's Digital Toolkit: Explaining Variation in Internet Filtering in Authoritarian Regimes.” Politics & Policy 44(6): 1158–91. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12189 Hiroi, Taeko, and Sawa Omori. 2013. “Causes and Triggers of Coups d'état: An Event History Analysis.” Politics & Policy 41(1): 39–64. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12001 Hunter, Lance Y., Josh Rutland, and Zachary King. 2020. “Leaving the Barracks: Military Coups in Developing Democracies.” Politics & Policy 48(6): 1062–103. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12383

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Section: Theory Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

Losing power safely: Explaining the variation in dictators' responses to anti‐regime protests

et al. 2022

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“…The letter stated that if the government cannot show the resolve to quash protests, the generals and commanders will take the control. 7 These examples, as well as research on the "endgame coups" show that the military leaderships launch a coup in response to popular mass uprisings (Koehler & Albrecht 2021), especially when they perceive that the incumbent government fails to suppress the dissidents.…”

Section: (Re)actions and Removalmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tenure through Tyranny? Repression, Dissent, and Leader Removal in Africa and Latin America, 1990–2006

Davenport

RezaeeDaryakenari

Wood

2021

Journal of Global Security Studies

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With few exceptions, prior research on leadership survival focuses largely on state institutional characteristics or economic context. We shift this orientation by explicitly considering the important role contentious interactions between the incumbent regime and dissident actors play in determining the duration of leader tenure as well as the manner in which a leader is removed. Specifically, we focus on the severity of the incumbent leader's response to dissident challenges. We contend that the severity of this response represents a critical signal which informs the decisions of specific audiences that ultimately determine the incumbent's survival. To evaluate our argument, we employ detailed information on dissent–repression dynamics and leader survival for a leader-month sample of 69 African and Latin American states between 1990 and 2006. Our results suggest that incumbents are vulnerable to coup d’ état when government repression is perceived as weaker than would normally be expected for a given challenge. By contrast, removal via revolution becomes increasingly likely when repression dramatically exceeds the levels that would normally be warranted given the extant challenge.

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“…In the post-2011 MENA region, this cleavage has triggered political polarization and a military coup in Egypt in 2013 (Holmes 2019). More generally, scholars of regime change and democratization have long recognized the danger that regime hardliners might prompt military intervention in a roll-back coup (Koehler and Albrecht 2021; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986).…”

Section: Political Cleavages and Support For Role Expansionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Role Model or Role Expansion? Popular Perceptions of the Military in Tunisia

Albrecht

Bufano

Koehler

2021

Political Research Quarterly

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This article introduces a theory on military role expansion in emerging democracies and poses a broad question: who wants the military to adopt which role in society and politics? Drawing on an original, nationally representative survey conducted in Tunisia, the article explores people’s preferences for the military to remain a security provider or serve in government and contribute to policing protests. Findings reveal that public support for military role expansion is substantial and varies across political cleavages. We test hypotheses to account for cleavages driven by the country’s authoritarian past versus partisan divides during Tunisia’s transition to democracy. Findings indicate that popular support for military role expansion is driven by anti-system sentiments prevalent in contemporary Tunisian politics: while voters prefer the military as a role model for security provision, non-voters support its enhanced role in politics. These observations have ample implications for the research programs on civil–military relations and the dynamics of democratic consolidation. Tunisia’s experience warrants greater attention to anti-system attitudes caused by people’s disillusionment with democratic procedures. In turn, authoritarian legacies do not appear to play a prominent role during such challenging transitions toward democratic consolidation.

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Revolutions and the Military: Endgame Coups, Instability, and Prospects for Democracy

Cited by 30 publications

References 66 publications

Losing power safely: Explaining the variation in dictators' responses to anti‐regime protests

Losing power safely: Explaining the variation in dictators' responses to anti‐regime protests

Tenure through Tyranny? Repression, Dissent, and Leader Removal in Africa and Latin America, 1990–2006

Role Model or Role Expansion? Popular Perceptions of the Military in Tunisia

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