Rewarding Human Rights? Selective Aid Sanctions against Repressive States

Abstract

This article provides theoretical and empirical solutions to two connected puzzles in the study of foreign aid and human rights: Do foreign aid donors use aid sanctions to punish repressive states, and if so, why? I show that donors impose aid sanctions selectively. Aid sanctions typically occur when repressive states do not have close political ties to aid donors, when violations have negative consequences for donors and when violations are widely publicized. Using a data set of bilateral foreign aid to 118 developing countries between 1981 and 2004, I find that variation in these factors largely accounts for the differing aid sanctions that result from objectively similar rights violations by the governments of developing countries.

Do authoritarian regimes receive more Chinese development finance than democratic ones? Empirical evidence for Africa

“…Based on his early theory, several studies have analysed the motivations 4 For an extensive overview of China's aid, FDI and trade flows to Africa, see Broich and Szirmai (2014). of democratic donors' aid allocation. A broad consensus has emerged that democratic donors mainly target 'democracy aid' to countries which will likely care about both transitions to democracy and maintaining or consolidating existing democratic regimes (Bermeo, 2011;Nielsen, 2013;Nielsen & Nielson, 2010). A separate strand of literature empirically examines the effects of democratic aid and the probability of democratic transition yielding ambiguous results (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2007;Djankov, Montalvo, & Reynal-Querol, 2008;Dunning, 2004;Goldsmith, 2001;Knack, 2004).…”

Human Rights Shaming Through INGOs and Foreign Aid Delivery

“…Some argue that donor governments prioritize geostrategic or economic considerations over human rights, making it unlikely that aid officials will systematically punish recipient governments for human rights violations (Alesina and Dollar, 2000;Neumayer, 2003a,b). Others find that donor governments sanction human rights violations with reductions in foreign aid, although cuts are limited to specific aid types and sectors (Cingranelli and Pasquarello, 1985;Lebovic and Voeten, 2009;Nielsen, 2013). 2 This paper strengthens our knowledge on the link between human rights and foreign aid policy by developing and testing a model of foreign aid delivery that identifies human rights international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) as an influential force in foreign aid decision making.…”

“…1 Among scholars interested in the nexus between foreign and human rights, however, a long standing debate continues over whether donor governments use foreign aid to sanction government-led repression in aid-receiving countries (Cingranelli and Pasquarello, 1985;Alesina and Dollar, 1992;Apodaca and Stohl, 1999;Alesina and Dollar, 2000;Rioux and Belle, 2005;Neumayer, 2003a,b;Lebovic and Voeten, 2009;Nielsen, 2013). Some argue that donor governments prioritize geostrategic or economic considerations over human rights, making it unlikely that aid officials will systematically punish recipient governments for human rights violations (Alesina and Dollar, 2000;Neumayer, 2003a,b).…”

“…Lebovic and Voeten (2009) find that donor governments pressure international organizations to sanction repressive behavior with cuts in multilateral aid, while bilateral aid flows between donors and the repressive recipient government remain unchanged. Nielsen (2013) disaggregates bilateral aid into its various sectors, showing that human rights violations lead donor governments to cut economic aid but not humanitarian aid. The latter two findings by Lebovic and Voeten (2009) and Nielsen (2013) make important contributions to the literature as they disaggregate aid and are based on a more nuanced understanding of the decision-making process.…”

“…Nielsen (2013) disaggregates bilateral aid into its various sectors, showing that human rights violations lead donor governments to cut economic aid but not humanitarian aid. The latter two findings by Lebovic and Voeten (2009) and Nielsen (2013) make important contributions to the literature as they disaggregate aid and are based on a more nuanced understanding of the decision-making process. Both works theorize and test for important heterogeneity within foreign aid.…”