Reworking Strategic Models of Executive-Judicial Relations: Insights from New African Democracies

VonDoepp, Peter; Ellett, Rachel

doi:10.5129/001041511793931843

Cited by 29 publications

(24 citation statements)

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“…At the implementation stage, judicial power is the ability to induce compliance by political elites and the public (Hall 2010; Staton 2010). Judicial power is important because: (1) courts lack formal mechanisms to enforce their rulings and are reliant on political elites and the public for the full realization of their power and (2) courts, particularly those in emerging democracies with histories of executive dominance, are vulnerable to varieties of political constraint (e.g., Clark 2011; Helmke 2012; Rosenberg 1992; Staton 2010; Vanberg 2005; VonDoepp 2009; VonDoepp and Ellett 2011; Widner and Scher 2008).…”

Section: Judicial Power: Conceptualizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These tools can range from influence to outright domination depending on context. For example, executives have used appointment and removal as a vehicle of political control over judiciaries (Ellett 2013; Gloppen 2003; VonDoepp and Ellett 2011). Politicians may also threaten or lodge attacks on judicial power (“court-curbing”), which can constrain judicial decision making (e.g., Clark 2011; Helmke 2012; Rosenberg 1992; Staton 2010; Vanberg 2005; VonDoepp 2009; VonDoepp and Ellett 2011).…”

Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Does Public Support for Judicial Power Depend on Who is in Political Power? Testing a Theory of Partisan Alignment in Africa

Bartels

Kramon

2019

Am Polit Sci Rev

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Judicial power is central to democratic consolidation and the rule of law. Public support is critical for establishing and protecting it. Conventional wisdom holds that this support is rooted in apolitical factors and not dependent on who is in political power. By contrast, we argue that support may be driven by instrumental partisan motivations and therefore linked to partisan alignment with the executive. We test the argument with survey evidence from 34 African countries. To provide causal evidence, we conduct difference-in-differences analyses leveraging Ghana’s three presidential transitions since 2000. Across Africa, support for judicial power is high, while trust in courts is lower. However, presidential co-partisans are less supportive of horizontal judicial power over the president and more supportive of vertical power over the people. The article demonstrates the importance of partisan alignment with the executive in shaping support for judicial power, with implications for judicial behavior and legitimacy.

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Section: Judicial Power: Conceptualizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Public Support for Judicial Power Depend on Who is in Political Power? Testing a Theory of Partisan Alignment in Africa

Bartels

Kramon

2019

Am Polit Sci Rev

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“…While Widner (2001) attributes the rise of judicial independence since the end of colonialism to the role of judges within the judiciary fighting for the independence of courts, Prempeh (2017) offers cautious optimism that the judicial constitutional revival in Africa has been curtailed by imperial presidencies that are too strong to be checked by weak legislatures. VonDoepp (2006) and VonDoepp and Ellet (2011) examine factors that might affect judicial assertiveness suggesting that the security of tenure by the incumbent, extent of power concentration in one actor, and the level of interest in a given case by political actors will determine whether judges will choose to be assertive or exercise strategic self-restraint. In analysis of Uganda, Tanzania and Malawi, Ellet (2013) finds that judicial independence was higher in countries that had a robust civil society, a strong independent media, and a strong law society.…”

Section: Theory: Judicial Systems and Electoral Violencementioning

confidence: 99%

The Role of the Courts in Mitigating Election Violence in Nigeria

Burchard¹,

Simati²

2019

cea

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Esta publicação é financiada por fundos nacionais através da FCT -Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia no âmbito do UID/CPO/03122/2013Violence occurs in a slight majority of elections held in sub-Saharan Africa. Several recent studies have examined the effectiveness of various interventions on the prevalence of violent elections; however, the role of the courts has been relatively less studied. Using data on electoral violence during the 2015 and 2019 Nigerian elections, we examine under what conditions courts can moderate election-related violence. We find that successfully challenging an election outcome in the courts is related to a reduction in the lethality of violence in the next election, but only if the courts are generally perceived as trustworthy. These findings indicate that in addition to building judicial capability, improving generalized trust in judicial institutions is key to reducing electoral violence. O papel dos tribunais na redução da violência eleitoral na NigériaA violência ocorre numa ligeira maioria das eleições realizadas na África subsariana. Vários estudos recentes têm analisado a eficácia de diversas intervenções sobre a prevalência de eleições violentas; no entanto, o papel dos tribunais tem sido relativamente menos estudado. Utilizando dados sobre a violência eleitoral durante as eleições nigerianas de 2015 e 2019, examinamos em que condições os tribunais podem moderar a violência associada às eleições. Observamos que contestar com sucesso um resultado eleitoral nos tribunais está relacionado com uma redução da letalidade da violência nas eleições seguintes, mas só se os tribunais forem comummente percebidos como confiáveis. Estes resultados indicam que além de reforçar a capacidade judicial, melhorar a confiança generalizada nas instituições judiciais é fundamental para reduzir a violência eleitoral.Palavras-chave: eleições, violência eleitoral, poder judicial, resolução de disputas, confiança institucional, Nigéria

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“…The second reason relates to uncertainty, which is critical to strategic electoral explanations because it affects the probability of and risks associated with losing office (VonDoepp & Ellet ). Electorally competitive non‐democracies are polities that, due to the nature of public support for parties and lack of trust, exhibit higher levels of uncertainty than consolidated democracies (Popova ).…”

Section: Competition Independence and Non‐democracymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although considered the dominant explanation for variation in de facto independence in democracies (VonDoepp & Ellet ), the role of electoral competition is marginal in research on courts in non‐democracies (Popova ). Most commonly, those studying judiciaries in non‐democracies assume competition plays no role in explaining levels of behavioural independence, even if it thought relevant in explaining whether constitutions formally grant review powers to the judiciary (Ginsburg & Versteeg 2013) .…”

Section: Competition Independence and Non‐democracymentioning

confidence: 99%

Political competition and de facto judicial independence in non‐democracies

Epperly

2016

European J Political Res

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This article investigates the role of political competition in explaining de facto judicial independence in non‐democratic regimes. It argues that the electoral, political insurance explanation popular in the study of courts in democracies also offers explanatory power in the autocratic context, despite popular wisdom otherwise: due to the relatively greater risks of losing power in non‐democracies, electoral competition is highly salient when present. This is examined via hierarchical and fixed effects models that show competition strongly associated with increased levels of independence. This relationship is robust to alternative model and data specification, and has strong out‐of‐sample predictive accuracy.

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Reworking Strategic Models of Executive-Judicial Relations: Insights from New African Democracies

Cited by 29 publications

References 0 publications

Does Public Support for Judicial Power Depend on Who is in Political Power? Testing a Theory of Partisan Alignment in Africa

Does Public Support for Judicial Power Depend on Who is in Political Power? Testing a Theory of Partisan Alignment in Africa

The Role of the Courts in Mitigating Election Violence in Nigeria

Political competition and de facto judicial independence in non‐democracies

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