Rights to the Oceans: Foundational Arguments Reconsidered

Abstract

This article examines theories of ocean rights based on the works of Hugo Grotius and Samuel von Pufendorf. Grotius's object‐centred view uses features of the natural world to justify claims to external objects. I show that Grotius's view is inadequate, because it relies on an outdated claim that oceanic resources are sufficiently abundant for anybody to use. Further, adaptations of his view are wanting, because they either rely on arbitrary distinctions or disregard the values of cultural minorities. Pufendorf's relational view constructs rights through the exercise of human will. While Pufendorf believes that agreements create rights, he also argues that property rights can be unilaterally acquired from the commons without express consent from others. The relational view is a viable alternative to the object‐centred view, because it both delimits territorial claims over the ocean to a ‘modest’ size and also respects cultural variability. A major aim of this article is to present Pufendorf's theory of territorial rights extended over oceans and to demonstrate how it is useful for assessing contemporary disputes. In the final sections, I apply the relational view to Canadian claims to the Northwest Passage, and I also sketch implications for assessing expanding claims to the seabed.

Territorial sovereignty and humankind's common heritage☆

“…229 and 233, respectively. See also Armstrong (2017); Moore (2015); Nine (2014Nine ( , 2019; Mancilla (2016Mancilla ( , 2018. 2 The website for the World Heritage has an abundance of information and resources, not least the List.…”

“…229 and 233, respectively. See also Armstrong (2017); Moore (2015); Nine (2014, 2019); Mancilla (2016, 2018).…”