RIPTE: Runtime Integrity Protection Based on Trusted Execution for IoT Device

Abstract

Software attacks like worm, botnet, and DDoS are the increasingly serious problems in IoT, which had caused large-scale cyber attack and even breakdown of important information infrastructure. Software measurement and attestation are general methods to detect software integrity and their executing states in IoT. However, they cannot resist TOCTOU attack due to their static features and seldom verify correctness of control flow integrity. In this paper, we propose a novel and practical scheme for software trusted execution based on lightweight trust. Our scheme RIPTE combines dynamic measurement and control flow integrity with PUF device binding key. Through encrypting return address of program function by PUF key, RIPTE can protect software integrity at runtime on IoT device, enabling to prevent the code reuse attacks. The results of our prototype’s experiment show that it only increases a small size TCB and has a tiny overhead in IoT devices under the constraint on function calling. In sum, RIPTE is secure and efficient in IoT device protection at runtime.

TZEAMM: An Efficient and Secure Active Measurement Method Based on TrustZone

“…If you rely only on static measurements, the safety of the system is not guaranteed. For example, static measurements are not able to handle TOU-TOC (time of use-time of check) attacks [21,41,43], where the process remains unafected before the measurement but is destroyed afterwards. Only with the help of dynamic measurement and the defnition of an appropriate measurement period can we ensure the security of the system during runtime.…”

“…Te REE can only access the resources of REE and cannot access the resources of the TEE [16]. Terefore, researchers [15,[17][18][19][20][21] often take advantage of the security of the TEE by setting up measurement modules in it. In this way, the resources in the REE are measured regularly to ensure their security.…”

“…(2) Performance degradation due to active measurement modules working in the TEE. Since active measurements require initiative and regularity, this is usually achieved by improving the priority of the active measurement module and confguring the measurement cycle with high frequency [21]. Te active measurement module is deployed in the TEE.…”

Securing 5G-IoT Device Connectivity and Coverage Using Boltzmann Machine Keys Generation

“…Other threats can affect all three domains at once. e 5G-enabled IoT device security system is made up of the following fundamentals: operators, manufacturers, and other stakeholders develop [23] norms for how global networks interact through standards. is entails evaluating the best ways to protect IoT device networks and people from malicious attacks.…”

Trusted Execution Environment Hardware by Isolated Heterogeneous Architecture for Key Scheduling

“…Zhao et al [20] presented an RoT by using Physical Unclonable Function (PUF), which is based on Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) to provide better secure storage. Qin et al [21] proposed a TEE by combining dynamic measurement and integrity flow control with a PUF device for storing keys and returning program functions' addresses. Benhani et al [22] evaluated the security of ARM TrustZone in Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), thus recommending isolation between secure IPs and non-secure IPs to evade various kinds of attack models.…”