In deciding whether to support an international role of their country's currency, national policymakers are often influenced by lobbying from domestic sectoral groups. While these groups will be consistently more interested in some implications of international currency issuance than others, their specific preferences are likely to be highly context specific. Looking at the cases of the United States and China, we anticipate that domestic sectoral lobbying is unlikely to pressure either the US government to defend the dollar's international role vigorously or the Chinese government to internationalize the renminbi fully. From this domestic sectoral perspective, the future looks to be characterized by reluctant monetary leaders rather than increasingly aggressive currency competition between the United States and China.Keywords Money . Currency . Dollar . Renminbi . Sectoral groups JEL classification F33 . F59 . E42The future of the international monetary system will depend in part on whether policymakers in powerful countries (or regions in the case of the euro) actively support or oppose the international role of their respective currencies. Most existing literature assumes-either explicitly or implicitly-that policymakers rationally evaluate the benefits and costs of issuing an international currency on behalf of their polity as a whole. We know from historical experience, however, that policymaking in this area is influenced not just by calculations of the national (or regional) interest but also by lobbying from specific sectoral groups within issuing jurisdictions who experience these costs and benefits in different ways. Open Econ Rev (2012) 23:33-55