Rise of the Political Right in India: Hindutva-Development Mix, Modi Myth, and Dualities

Abstract

We are witnessing a global phenomenon of the rise of right‐wing leaders who combine nationalist rhetoric with a claim to challenge the pernicious effects of neoliberalism. But, upon achieving power, they do not oppose the business elite, instead, while paying lip service to the victims of economic processes, they direct the blame for those structural problems upon the minorities and “Others” within the rightwing nationalist imagination. In the Indian context, this is typified by the rise of Narendra Modi. The Modi‐led BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) and its coming to power in 2014 has similarities with Trump, and is also different from the earlier incarnations of the BJP. In the first part of this article, I explain the innovative nature of the specific Modi‐mix of Hindutva and Development, and outline the toxic impact his right‐wing populist government has had on a broad spectrum of Indian society and polity. However, in spite of the visible increase in real and symbolic violence across the country, Modi continues to remain popular and wield great influence. The second part of the article answers this apparent puzzle by providing an account of the work of the “Modi myth” that projects him as an ascetic, paternal, and decisive ruler. This political myth is constantly reinforced through medium, speech, and performance. Further, given the many disparate constituencies with differing concerns that Modi‐led BJP addresses itself to, the policy inconsistencies are reconciled by a strategic and systematic use of “forked tongue” speech that presents the different interests as being uniform. A populist right‐wing politics is constructed out of keeping these dualities in motion by speaking to the different constituencies with a forked tongue. I conclude by giving three examples of management of such dual domains: corporate/grassroots, national/international, India/Bharat.

‘Welcome to selfiestan’: identity and the networked gaze in Indian mobile media

“…Joining Instagram shortly after his victory (Mohan, 2014), Modi has become the most-followed sitting world leader on that platform, with 18.9 million followers as of March 2019 (compared to 12.2 million for US President Donald Trump, 5.9 million for Pope Francis, and 584,000 for Modi’s chief political rival, Rahul Gandhi). This dedication to new social media forms in general, and the selfie in particular, contrasts with the decidedly conservative ideology of the BJP, which is based in Hindutva, or the conviction that traditional Hindu customs, values, and rituals amount to the cultural hegemony of India (Kaul, 2017; Sinha, 2017). Nevertheless, the apparent success of ‘selfie phone’ marketing and sales coupled with the popularity of selfies within Hindutva politics may indicate an alignment of contemporary technological affordances and interpersonal communication methods with wider, long-standing South Asian cultural norms more deeply embedded in Hindu-influenced cultural frames and practices.…”

The ‘saffronisation’ of India and contemporary political ideology

“…During their rule over the last few years, the narrative centred around BJP's political ideology has also forged a notably more aggressive, muscular tone (Ganguly, 2015), reconceptualising Hindutva as a gendered, masculine being that becomes metonymic of an India that is ‘Hindu supremacist and masculinist – Muslims and other minorities are located as the Other of this body politic’ (Kaul, 2017, p. 525). This particular angle in the narrative then doesn't just depict Modi and the BJP as the moral compass of new India, but also justifies their rule by way of their Hindu roots, positioning them against the rule of a foreign other, 4 pushing an ‘antagonistic divide between “the people” and illegitimately powerful, born‐to‐rule elites by associating the latter with the foreign Other.…”

“…Chakravartty and Roy (2015, p. 318) further note that the ownership of media structures and networks in India also encourage production bias of prominent commercial media towards ‘telegenic populist leaders’, as such the last several years have seen the occupation of English‐language media by ‘Hindi language news media … [that has] allowed the BJP to successfully maneuver tensions between competing sets of elites – in this case marked by language (Hindi vs. English) and class (new entrepreneurial elites vs. established elites)’. This trend appears most evident in news media channels and national dailies, where the popularity of Hindi news media mushroomed after the dominance of English news media, which had continued from the late 1940s till 1990 reflecting urban views, but slowly giving way to Hindi news as political figures representing rural and caste politics of smaller towns grew to prominence (Kaul, 2017; Neyazi, 2011; Ninan, 2007). As such, the growth of Hindi newspapers began to represent ‘the rise of communal and identity politics in India’, and more recently, their growth can be argued to be a result of a ‘rise in literacy levels, aggressive marketing strategies, better transportation infrastructure, the rising political significance of the Hindi publics and an increasing awareness among the masses about participation in the political process’ (Neyazi, 2011, p. 78; see also Michelutti, 2008; Srivastava, 2015).…”

Populism, ontological insecurity and Hindutva: Modi and the masculinization of Indian politics

“…Propped up by its intimate relations with the wider Hindu nationalist movement, BJP succeeded in gaining a clear majority in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of parliament, raising concerns that India was turning into a majoritarian rather than a liberal democracy. Not only is Modi a lifelong member of the RSS, 4 which has the idea of a pure Hindu nation at its core, but the entire election campaign was run in close cooperation with the Sangh Parivar 5 and corporations invested in the symbolic and material accord that would bring Modi into power-often referred to as the 'Modi Wave' (Kaul 2017). Winning the election has not only impacted on domestic politics but has spilled over to foreign policy and the distinction between the two, in India and elsewhere, is becoming increasingly difficult to fathom.…”

“…In terms of sexual violence, Dalit women have been repeatedly targeted whenever their communities challenge oppression and exploitation, and Brahminical-patriarchal ideas of the Hindu right have been intensified through recent liberal policies and violently enforced through rituals of patriotism (Kabir 2014). Modi having been in charge of the most business-friendly government India has ever experienced (although some would argue it hides an ugly reality of crony capitalism; see Kaul 2017), it is easy to see how the election of him and the BJP may actually embolden upper-caste and economically powerful conservatives. Populist politics thus merge physical and ontological insecurity, tying together the body politic of the nation with the physical and structural violence against vulnerable groups or those viewed as pathological enemies of the Hindu nation.…”