Rising powers and order contestation: disaggregating the normative from the representational

Abstract

One of the central themes of the current literature on rising powers is that new aspirants to great power status pose a challenge to the underlying principles and norms that underpin the existing, Western-led order. However, in much of the literature, the nature and significance of rising powers for international order is imprecisely debated, in particular the concept and practice of ÔcontestationÕ. In this article we aim to establish a distinction between normative contestation and what can be thought of as Ôcontestation over representationÕ: that is, contestation over who is setting and overseeing the rules of the game rather than the content of the rules themselves and the kind of order that they underpin. This distinction is important for providing a more nuanced understanding of the nature of the current power transition and therefore for guiding attempts at accommodation on the part of the established powers. Theoretically, the paper engages with debates on international order and international society. Its empirical basis is provided by a thorough analysis of the discourse of rising power summitry, in particular at meetings of the BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization groupings.

Opening‐up labor mobility? Rising powers' rulemaking in trade agreements

“…In conclusion, our analysis of the expansion of labor mobility within the international trade regime underscores the expectation that "[r]ising powers will aim to place their imprint on reconstructed global institutions, and that stamp will differ markedly from a status quo supported by the incumbent powers" (Kahler 2013, p. 711). Rather than defying liberal trade rules, as much of the literature portends (Newman & Zala 2018), the transformation we observe reinforces market liberalization over protection. Whether this extension of markets also strengthens the "post-World War II liberal order" and the human rights values associated with it, however, is a different question.…”

Negotiating climate change: A frame analysis of COP21 in British, American, and Chinese news media

“…The order, emission reduction review for instance, was welcomed to be transparent, universal, and binding. News media upheld these underlying norms, rules, and practices, much of which have long been embedded in the existing Western-led order (Newman and Zala, 2018). Those who disrupted the order were thus criticized as laggards: climate change deniers or dissenting countries, such as China, Indian and Saudi Arabia.…”

Trading privileges for support: the strategic co-optation of emerging powers into international institutions

“…However, insofar as they focus on either conflictual accommodation or harmonious integration, they overlook a third mode of institutional adaptation that we call strategic co-optation . To some extent, co-optation is a combination of accommodation and integration, and we find occasional references to ‘co-optation’ in both accommodationist and integrationist PST contributions (Stephen 2012, 296–298; Acharya 2014, 154; Paul 2016, 18; Newman and Zala 2018, 871). However, co-optation differs from both accommodation and integration in important ways.…”