Rising Powers in Global Economic Governance: Mapping the Flexibility‐Empowerment Nexus

Heldt, Eugénia C.; Mahrenbach, Laura C.

doi:10.1111/1758-5899.12643

Cited by 8 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…However, given the United States' role as the Bank's largest net donor, we include this country in our analysis. 8 Coen and Pegram 2015;Fioretos and Heldt 2019;Heldt and Mahrenbach 2018;Schmidtke 2019a, 2019b;Mahrenbach 2013Mahrenbach , 2015Mahrenbach , 2019b ment finance.9 Yet other scholars have underlined the role played by domestic factors, including national norms, foreign policy strategies, interest groups and civil society pressure.10 In this article, we add to this literature by focusing on two neglected domestic factors-partisan politics and ministry control-to explain state preferences toward Bank reforms. Two logics in the existing literature explain how political parties affect international cooperation and, thus, how partisanship may be linked with state preferences toward IOE.…”

Section: 1mentioning

confidence: 98%

Reforming International Organizations

Heldt

Mahrenbach

2020

Global Governance

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Recent scholarship has highlighted the role of domestic pressures in determining state preferences toward the reform of international organizations (IO s). This article adds a new dimension by examining how partisanship and ministerial control affect state preferences toward IO empowerment. The article derives two expectations from the existing literature. First, partisan position will determine preferences toward IO empowerment. Second, when a government is constituted by multiple parties, the position of the party with the IO’s ministerial portfolio will determine the government’s position toward IO empowerment. The article illustrates this argument by examining the positions of four net donors (Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and two net recipients (Brazil and India) during the World Bank’s reforms. By bringing domestic politics back in, this article complements existing studies on the politics of IO reform and weighs in on central debates in comparative politics and international political economy.

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Section: 1mentioning

confidence: 98%

Reforming International Organizations

Heldt

Mahrenbach

2020

Global Governance

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“…They thus engage in strategic cooptation (Abbott et al, 2019;Dickson, 2000;Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006;Selznick, 1964). In the context of shifts in the global distribution of power, challengers of the institutional status quo may promise to step up their support for the institution in return for privileges that bring them closer to the leadership of the institution (Kruck and Zangl, 2019; see Heldt and Mahrenbach, 2019). Thus, challengers try to buy defenders' acceptance of institutional adjustments rather than forcing it.…”

Section: Strategic Cooptation: Buying Defendersmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Similarly, MacDonald (this issue) shows how Russia’s soft power –civil society support – enabled it to draw on rhetorical coercion and principled persuasion in promoting the codification of the customs of war during the Hague Conferences. Goddard (this issue) demonstrates that Japan built up its soft power to pursue adjustments to the ‘unequal treaties’ through a combination of principled persuasion and rhetorical coercion.…”

Section: The Choice Of Different Strategiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Shifts to another institution can only be considered as institutional adjustment if they are agreed among challengers and defenders of the institutional status quo. The one‐sided shift to competing institutions by challengers, namely, counter‐institutionalization (Helfer, 2009; Chin, 2014, 2019; Alter and Meunier, 2009; Morse and Keohane, 2014; Zürn, 2018; Lipscy, 2017), is a case of institutional change, but not one of institutional adaptation.…”

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The Adjustment of International Institutions to Global Power Shifts: A Framework for Analysis

Kruck

Zangl

2020

Global Policy

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As powers such as China and India rise, and powers such as the US and the UK decline, international institutions such as the United Nations Security Council, the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund come under pressure to adapt to new power realities. In the wake of global power shifts, both emerging and established powers may challenge the institutional status quo. Contrary to what most power transition and power shift theories assume, challengers do not always draw on power bargaining to pursue institutional adjustment. In some issue areas, they do, but in others they employ alternative strategies including strategic cooptation, rhetorical coercion and principled persuasion. In order to contribute to a better understanding of institutional adjustments to global power shifts, the introduction to this special issue theorizes these various strategies. First, we conceptualize power bargaining, strategic cooptation, rhetorical coercion and principled persuasion as distinct strategies for institutional adjustment. Second, we elaborate on the conditions under which challengers choose particular strategies. Third, we specify the conditions under which challengers are able to achieve institutional adaptation through a particular strategy. Finally, we discuss broader implications for the future of the international order and the management of global power shifts. Policy Implications • Efforts to manage global power shifts should not focus exclusively on challenges from rising powers but must take into account challenges from declining powers too. Not only China is challenging the current international order, but in some issue areas the US is acting as a challenger too. To manage global power shifts both challenges from rising and declining powers have to be taken seriously. • In the wake of global power shifts, challengers of the institutional status quo need not always rely on power bargaining. Sometimes strategic cooptation, rhetorical coercion or principled persuasion are not only better suited to attain institutional adjustment; they are also less conflictive. They thus allow maintaining (or creating) cooperative relations between emerging and established powers, which will often be in the interest of challengers. • In the wake of global power shifts, defenders of the institutional status quo should not assume that challengers will engage in power bargaining. After all, policy responses that are adequate for addressing power bargaining are often counterproductive in dealing with strategic cooptation, rhetorical coercion or principled persuasion. As the latter are less conflictive, they allow maintaining (or creating) cooperative relations between emerging and established powers, which will often be in the interest of defenders. • The conditions of institutional adjustment differ from issue area to issue area and even from institution to institution. Policy advice on how to manage global power shifts should not brush over these differences. Chinese challenges to the global human rights regime c...

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“…The demand for change came with the rise of emerging economies over the last two decades, a power shift that has shaped the international system in important ways and had distinct impacts on the politics of climate change. The growth of China, India, Brazil and other large developing countries has forced some key institutions of global governance to adapt, a dynamic explored by various scholars (Heldt and Mahrenbach, 2019; Kahler, 2013; Kaya, 2015; Lipscy, 2017; Zangl et al, 2016). However, a striking feature of the climate case is that it was not rising but established powers – the United States, the EU, and other industrialized countries – who sought to challenge the institutional status quo.…”

Section: The Paris Agreement As a Political Compromisementioning

confidence: 99%

Emerging Powers and Differentiation in Global Climate Institutions

Thompson

2020

Global Policy

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The Paris Agreement on climate change brought states from the North and South together under a common framework to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. This was a remarkable institutional adjustment for a regime that had always maintained a strict distinction between developed and developing countries and imposed meaningful obligations only on the former. To better understand this change, I look at the negotiations surrounding the issue of 'differentiation'. The rising emissions of the emerging economies created a demand for institutional change on the part of key industrialized countries; however, they faced resistance from the increasingly assertive BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India and China). The challengers ultimately adopted strategic cooptation as their main negotiation strategy, offering compromises in the areas of climate finance and the legal form of new commitments. The climate case sheds light on the impact of power shifts in the domain of global environmental governance and illustrates that calls for change sometime comes from established rather than rising powers. Policy Implications • The success of the global climate regime will depend on its ability to attract participation by a large number of heterogeneous states, from the developed and developing world alike. This implies that debates over 'common but differentiated responsibilities' will remain a central part of the negotiations.

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Rising Powers in Global Economic Governance: Mapping the Flexibility‐Empowerment Nexus

Cited by 8 publications

References 28 publications

Reforming International Organizations

Reforming International Organizations

The Adjustment of International Institutions to Global Power Shifts: A Framework for Analysis

Emerging Powers and Differentiation in Global Climate Institutions

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