Risk acceptance and offensive war: The case of Russia under the Putin regime

Driedger, Jonas J.

doi:10.1080/13523260.2023.2164974

Cited by 8 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 42 publications

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“…Whatever the other goals, securing control of the strategic assets in Sevastopol and the prestige of bringing the historically significant territory back under direct Russian control evidently were intense and highly focused preferences. Some days before the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity had swept away the old 'pro-Russian' regime under Viktor Yanukovych, former chief of Russian general staff Yuri Baluyevsky had stated that events in Ukraine created new threats for Russia and that vital strategic areas in Russia's West, as well as the Black Sea Fleet, needed to be reinforced quickly (Allison, 2014(Allison, , p. 1278, on the Crimea annexation, see also Driedger, 2023aDriedger, , 2023b. In addition, various data points suggest that the annexation served to discredit the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity, minimizing the dangers of revolutionary sentiments spilling over into Russia.…”

Section: Crimeamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…By mid‐March 2014, Russia had completed the annexation of Crimea. It had carried out the operation tentatively, using measures that allowed for later deniability and retreat (Driedger, 2023a; see also Driedger, 2023b). The successful unfolding of the Crimea operation arguably contributed to the Kremlin's decision to gain maximum control over the strategically and ideologically important peninsula by fully annexing it, confident that, for more leverage over Ukraine, it could install a new conflict in the Ukrainian Donbass region, or the even larger ‘Novorossiya’, as Russian elites and ‘volunteers’ usually referred to it in 2014 (Allison, 2014; Treisman, 2016).…”

Section: Donbass Until Early 2022mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Conversely, the Russian elite apparently underestimated the extent of EU backlash that would follow the invasion, probably counting on similar intra‐EU divisions as in the past. Risk acceptance by the Russian elite relating to goals towards neighbouring states like Ukraine has risen since the mid‐2000s (Driedger, 2023), possibly indicating that Russian preferences towards Ukraine are becoming stronger in parallel with, and interaction to, those of the EU.…”

Section: Conclusion Implications and The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Preference Constellations in EU–Russian Crisis Bargaining over Syria and Ukraine

Driedger,

Krotz

2023

J of Common Market Studies

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The Russian invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 and the ensuing EU–Russian clash over the fate of Ukraine highlight the importance of explaining the outcomes of EU–Russian crisis bargaining. Complementing existing accounts, we argue that favourable preference constellations are key: The more determined, united and focused side prevails over its less interested, divided or unfocused counterpart. We first establish the inferiority of Russia's influence assets (economic, military, normative and allies) relative to the EU. We then use congruence analysis to reverse‐engineer crisis bargaining outcomes in key cases of EU–Russian crisis bargaining, showing that favourable preference constellations allowed Russia, despite inferior assets and EU opposition, to ensure Syrian dictator Assad's political survival, finalize the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and keep Donbass out of Kyiv's control since then. Finally, we discuss the implications of these findings for related areas, as well as for current and future EU–Russian crisis bargaining, specifically over Ukraine.

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Section: Crimeamentioning

confidence: 99%