2007
DOI: 10.1504/ijcis.2007.014120
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Risk and vulnerability games. The anti-satellite weaponry (ASAT)

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Cited by 7 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…While the public imagination is overcome with the idea of high-tech, antisatellite weaponry, such as lasers and interceptors fired from fighter planes, the truth is that ASAT capabilities are within the grasp of non-state actors of low sophistication and resources. As Gheorghe and Vamanu (2007) noted, an assailant with a laptop can make what he wants of a satellite, including veer it off course or compromise its functioning in some other way. The cost-to-benefit ratio of cyberattacks is very much in favor of the attacker, who requires only a skilled individual with basic equipment and an Internet connection.…”
Section: Deliberate Threatsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…While the public imagination is overcome with the idea of high-tech, antisatellite weaponry, such as lasers and interceptors fired from fighter planes, the truth is that ASAT capabilities are within the grasp of non-state actors of low sophistication and resources. As Gheorghe and Vamanu (2007) noted, an assailant with a laptop can make what he wants of a satellite, including veer it off course or compromise its functioning in some other way. The cost-to-benefit ratio of cyberattacks is very much in favor of the attacker, who requires only a skilled individual with basic equipment and an Internet connection.…”
Section: Deliberate Threatsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They are subject not only to manifestations of specific space phenomena, such as space weather and orbital debris impact, but also to the general harshness of their environment, in which temperatures, radiation, and other normal factors generate a high probability of spontaneous malfunction. At the same time, there are deliberate threats to space systems, facilitated by specific weaknesses and by an evolving international landscape of space actors, including not just rational states, but also rogue states and non-state actors with various levels of access to increasingly facile antisatellite weaponry (Gheorghe and Vamanu 2007).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…But the various accords and treaties are only valid until the first state breaks them and upends the entire strategic equilibrium. Meanwhile, legitimate technological capabilities, including for security and defense, are being developed which are innately dual use and can be repurposed for offensive actions as well [10]. Technological stasis is not an option, only a continuous diplomatic rapprochement that makes clear the risks of a confrontation in space and ensures that dialogue continues to defuse potential threats to the general peace of the "orbital commons" before they manifest to everyone's detriment.…”
Section: The Strategic Contextmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Even rogue nations with rudimentary ASAT capabilities are a threat. This was explored in a gaming exercise by Gheorghe and Vamanu (2007), who showed that publically available software and satellite orbital information could be used to calculate the proper intercept course to result in an ASATbased satellite kill. They concluded that space should be viewed as a readily-vulnerable critical infrastructure.…”
Section: Valuable Satellite Orbitsmentioning
confidence: 99%