Risk assessment in distributed authorization

Chapin, Peter; Skalka, Christian; Wang, X. Sean

doi:10.1145/1103576.1103581

Cited by 12 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…al are intended for developing metric of trust, but we found these principles applicable to our study as well [24]. The formal logic language introduced for measuring risks in trust delegation in the RT framework inspires us to describe our metric using abstract operators [6].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…Second, there is no naturally induced order between the execution of the exploit 1 and that of exploit 2, so they can be executed in any order. Intuitively, these two exploits meet at exploit 6 in the sense that we combine these two resistance values in the same formula when we compute R(6) = 1/(1/(r(1) + r(4)) + 1/r(2)) + r (6). At that point, the last composition operator used is ⊕ (that is, the exploit 4 and exploit 2 are .…”

Section: Fig 2 An Example Of Attack Resistance In Real Numbermentioning

confidence: 99%

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Measuring the Overall Security of Network Configurations Using Attack Graphs

Wang

Singhal²,

Jajodia

2007

Data and Applications Security XXI

117

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Abstract. Today's computer systems face sophisticated intrusions during which multiple vulnerabilities can be combined for reaching an attack goal. The overall security of a network system cannot simply be determined based on the number of vulnerabilities. To quantitatively assess the security of networked systems, one must first understand which and how vulnerabilities can be combined for an attack. Such an understanding becomes possible with recent advances in modeling the composition of vulnerabilities as attack graphs. Based on our experiences with attack graph analysis, we explore different concepts and issues on a metric to quantify potential attacks. To accomplish this, we present an attack resistance metric for assessing and comparing the security of different network configurations. This paper describes the metric at an abstract level as two composition operators with features for expressing additional constraints. We consider two concrete cases. The first case assumes the domain of attack resistance to be real number and the second case represents resistances as a set of initial security conditions. We show that the proposed metric satisfies desired properties and that it adheres to common sense. At the same time, it generalizes a previously proposed metric that is also based on attack graphs. It is our belief that the proposed metric will lead to novel quantitative approaches to vulnerability analysis, network hardening, and attack responses.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 95%

Section: Fig 2 An Example Of Attack Resistance In Real Numbermentioning

confidence: 99%

Measuring the Overall Security of Network Configurations Using Attack Graphs

Wang

Singhal²,

Jajodia

2007

Data and Applications Security XXI

117

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“…Chapin et al, presented a trust management language, which is able to reason about risk induced by credentials [44]. Although RAR utilizes X.509 certificates for role membership proof, the risk of secure collaboration in RAR's settings is more related to permissions and users' requests but not credentials.…”

Section: Riskmentioning

confidence: 99%

RAR: A role-and-risk based flexible framework for secure collaboration

et al. 2011

Future Generation Computer Systems

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“…In prior work, we developed preliminary foundations for the system RT R [11]. However, the current presentation has a more rigorously developed metatheory and chain discovery algorithm, and a more general theory of authorization thresholds.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this paper, we develop a trust management logic called RT R , introduced in a simpler form in previous work [11], that formally incorporates formal risk assessment. The system is a variant of RT [19], and includes an abstract definition of risk, a means to associate risk with individual assertions, and a semantics that assesses risk of authorization by combining the risk of assertions used in authorization decisions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Risk management for distributed authorization

Skalka

Wang

Chapin

2007

JCS

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Distributed authorization takes into account several elements, including certificates that may be provided by non-local actors. While most trust management systems treat all assertions as equally valid up to certificate authentication, realistic considerations may associate risk with some of these elements, for example some actors may be less trusted than others. Furthermore, practical online authorization may require certain levels of risk to be tolerated. In this paper, we introduce a trust management logic based on the system RT that incorporates formal risk assessment. This formalization allows risk levels to be associated with authorization, and authorization risk thresholds to be precisely specified and enforced. We also develop an algorithm for automatic authorization in a distributed environment, that is directed by risk considerations. A variety of practical applications are discussed.

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Risk assessment in distributed authorization

Cited by 12 publications

References 10 publications

Measuring the Overall Security of Network Configurations Using Attack Graphs

Measuring the Overall Security of Network Configurations Using Attack Graphs

RAR: A role-and-risk based flexible framework for secure collaboration

Risk management for distributed authorization

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