2020
DOI: 10.1109/access.2020.3014785
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Risk Assessment of Cyber Attacks on Power Grids Considering the Characteristics of Attack Behaviors

Abstract: The quick development of smart grids coupled with IoT devices has opened breaches of security leading to cyberattacks done by attackers with different purposes. In this study, a behavior model is proposed to investigate the risk of cyber attacks on power grids, where the utility value is determined by subjective attack attitude and characteristics of candidate targets firstly, and then the behaviors of attack target selection and attack resource allocation are described by the probability response and utility … Show more

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Cited by 10 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…where Z ci indicates whether a node has experienced a DoS attack; Z ci = 1 indicates that node i has been attacked, and Z ci = 0 indicates that node i is operating normally. FDI attacks tamper with the monitoring data, which affects the state estimation process of the control center and causes the state estimator to output the wrong value to the system operator, which may lead to the wrong control decision [19], [20]. Additionally, it is assumed that the attacker is allowed to completely control the information node; that is, the monitoring data or instructions of the node can always be tampered with.…”
Section: B Combined Information Attack Mechanismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…where Z ci indicates whether a node has experienced a DoS attack; Z ci = 1 indicates that node i has been attacked, and Z ci = 0 indicates that node i is operating normally. FDI attacks tamper with the monitoring data, which affects the state estimation process of the control center and causes the state estimator to output the wrong value to the system operator, which may lead to the wrong control decision [19], [20]. Additionally, it is assumed that the attacker is allowed to completely control the information node; that is, the monitoring data or instructions of the node can always be tampered with.…”
Section: B Combined Information Attack Mechanismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…According to the defensive effect function and the evaluation model (Chen et al 2020a), the probability that all smart meters on client k attacked is:…”
Section: Safety Risk Assessmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We assume that an attacker randomly selects the smart meters to attack, and the possibility of a smart meter being attacked is related to its defensive degree. The stronger the defence, the more difficult it is to attack (Chen et al, 2020a) and the less likely it is to be attacked. The number of smart meters that the client k is responsible for is Mk.…”
Section: Client Selection‐based Fed_adbn Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…There have been many related works on risk assessment for cyberattacks on power systems. In [22], considering the characteristics of attack behaviors, a risk assessment method on power grids was proposed. In [23], a cyber-physical security evaluation approach and contingency ranking technique for power infrastructures were proposed.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%