Risk attitudes in a social context

Rohde, Ingrid M. T.; Rohde, Kirsten I. M.

doi:10.1007/s11166-011-9127-z

Cited by 85 publications

(72 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…They find a significant treatment effect, such that participants have a lower overall willingness to pay when the risks are correlated. This result that social comparisons matter in such uncertain situations supports several other recent experiments (e.g., Rohde and Rohde 2011;Linde and Sonnemans 2012). However, it seems apparent that peer effects may also work in the opposite direction.…”

Section: Contribution Of the Special Issuesupporting

confidence: 90%

Behavioral insurance: Theory and experiments

2014

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"Risk and insurance" provides an illustrative set of decisions made in the presence of uncertainty. As behavioral models become more integrated into economics and finance, many of their effects are illustrated quite well within insurance markets. Especially noteworthy are the complementary roles of theory and experiments. This article reviews the interactive role of experiments and theory in analyzing insurance demand from a behavioral perspective. We pay special attention to several models of underinvestment in insurance or in other risk-mitigation markets.

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Section: Contribution Of the Special Issuesupporting

confidence: 90%

Behavioral insurance: Theory and experiments

2014

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“…Bolton and Ockenfels (2010) has 364 deciders, but each of them takes one decision in one social context only. Rohde and Rohde (2011);Linde and Sonnemans (2012) both have about 120 participants making about 40 choices each. Each subject has half a chance to be a decider.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…34 We adapted this system for our case where subjects could play different roles in the experiment and different tasks could be paid out. We followed Güth et al (2008); Rohde and Rohde (2011);Linde and Sonnemans (2012); Gamba et al (2014);Vieider et al (2015) in delaying the revelation of what type, decision-maker or recipient, a subject is. 56 There were 118 "decision-maker" envelopes that described one of the 9 times 12=108 social lotteries comparisons or one of the 10 safe social outcome comparisons.…”

Section: Paymentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social Preferences Under Risk: Ex-Post Fairness vs. Efficiency

Gaudeul

2015

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Social Preferences under Risk:Ex-Post Fairness vs. Efficiency * Alexia Gaudeul † July 6, 2015Social lotteries are lotteries that are played along with someone else. The experimental literature indicates that risk attitudes depend on how one's situation in the safe alternative compares to that of a peer. Evaluation of the risky alternative also depends on whether the lottery gives equal payoffs ex-post. Experiments usually present payoffs side-by-side (payoff for me, payoff for the other). This draws attention to inequality in payoffs and thus gives weight to fairness concerns. We consider whether showing own payoff as a share of the total payoff changes risk preferences. Showing total payoffs explicitly draws attention to risk at the level of the pair and may thus moderate dislike for negatively correlated lotteries, as those are less risky at the level of the group. We find that a significant minority of subjects keeps on disliking lotteries that lead to ex-post unequal distributions of payoffs. Subjects also tend to prefer taking a risk rather than obtaining safe but unequal payoff distributions. Beyond reconciling findings from the previous literature, we also discuss differences in sensitivity to the social setting across individuals and the relation between social value orientation in safe and in risky settings.JEL Codes: C91, D63, D81

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“…Cettolin, Riedl et al (2016) find that uninvolved third parties allocate more to a person who is exposed to a lottery, compared to another who receives the certainty equivalent. Rohde and Rohde (2011) find that social planners prefer allocations where each recipient's risky allocation is independently drawn, com-pared to all participants facing one and the same lottery. In Cappelen, Konow et al (2013) a third party needs to allocate pooled money from two players that made more or less risky choices before.…”

Section: If Additionally Individuals Can Misrepresent Their Types ?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Experimental Social Planners: Good Natured, But Overly Optimistic

Engel

Hippel

2017

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractPublic goods are dealt with in two literatures that neglect each other. Mechanism design advises a social planner that expects individuals to misrepresent their valuations. Experiments study the provision of the good when preferences might be non-standard. We introduce the problem of the mechanism design literature into a public good experiment. Valuations for the good are heterogeneous. To each group we add a participant with power to impose a contribution scheme. We study four settings: the authority has no personal interest and (1) valuations are common knowledge or (2) active participants may misrepresent their types; the authority has a personal interest (3) and must decide before learning her own valuation or (4) knows her own valuation. Disinterested social planners predominantly choose a payment rule that gives every group member the same final payoff, even if misrepresentation is possible. Authorities are overly optimistic about truth telling. Interested social planners abuse their power, except if the opportunity cost of a more balanced rule is small. JEL: C91, D02, D03, D61, D62, D64, H23, K12

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Risk attitudes in a social context

Cited by 85 publications

References 23 publications

Behavioral insurance: Theory and experiments

Behavioral insurance: Theory and experiments

Social Preferences Under Risk: Ex-Post Fairness vs. Efficiency

Experimental Social Planners: Good Natured, But Overly Optimistic

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