2020
DOI: 10.1109/tnse.2019.2910837
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Risk of Cascading Blackouts Given Correlated Component Outages

Abstract: Cascading blackouts typically occur when nearly simultaneous outages occur in k out of N components in a power system, triggering subsequent failures that propagate through the network and cause significant load shedding. While large cascades are rare, their impact can be catastrophic, so quantifying their risk is important for grid planning and operation. A common assumption in previous approaches to quantifying such risk is that the k initiating component outages are statistically independent events. However… Show more

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Cited by 12 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…It is proven in cascading simulation that initial outage spatial correlation has a substantial impact on assessing cascading risk [23], [24]. In general, the increased correlation of close initial outages increases the cascading risk.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is proven in cascading simulation that initial outage spatial correlation has a substantial impact on assessing cascading risk [23], [24]. In general, the increased correlation of close initial outages increases the cascading risk.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Moreover, it is assumed that the initial outages in each scenario are independent, i.e., the probability of an initial event is the product of the individual outage probabilities. Correlations between initial outages, such as aging degree [25] and spatial correlation [26], [27] have been already investigated in some studies. Such factors can be applied if desired without affecting the general methodology presented here.…”
Section: B Risk Assessment Of Cascading Failuresmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Although N − 1 contingencies occur more frequently in practice, N − 2 and N − 3 contingencies are catastrophic events that are worth considering as they are harder to correct. Extreme weather events, attacks, or component aging could cause these N − k (where k ≥ 2) contingency scenarios to occur [57]. Adding uncertain renewable energy sources such as wind energy to power networks increases the probability of correlated faults and thus the possibility of N − 2 and N − 3 contingencies [58].…”
Section: Simulationsmentioning
confidence: 99%