Risk orientation as a predictor in the Prisoner's Dilemma

Dolbear, F. Trenery; Lave, Lester B.

doi:10.1177/002200276601000409

Cited by 29 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Some researchers reported no significant association between risk orientation and cooperation (e.g., de Heus et al, 2010;Dolbear & Lave, 1966). However, Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis (2002) and Parks (2004) found that risk-seeking people cooperated more.…”

Section: Risk Orientationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Expectation and cooperation in prisoner’s dilemmas: The moderating role of game riskiness

2015

Psychon Bull Rev

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This paper investigated the effect of risk orientation, game riskiness, and expectation of cooperation on cooperation in one-shot prisoner's dilemmas (PD). Participants in pairs played PD games that varied on game riskiness such that for half of the games cooperation was more risky than defection (more risky games) while for another half cooperation was less risky (less risky games). They estimated how likely it was that the other player was going to cooperate (expectation of cooperation) before they made their cooperation/ defection decision on each game. Supporting the Goal/ Expectation Hypothesis, we replicated the effect that expectation of cooperation enhanced cooperation. We also found that risk-seeking individuals cooperated more in more risky games whereas risk-averse individuals cooperated more in less risky games. More importantly, we found that game riskiness moderated the effect of expectation of cooperation on cooperation. The positive effect of expectation of cooperation on cooperation was stronger for more risky games than for less risky games. Our results illustrated how the relation between expectation and cooperation as stipulated by the Goal/Expectation Hypothesis was moderated by riskiness of the situations.

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Section: Risk Orientationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Expectation and cooperation in prisoner’s dilemmas: The moderating role of game riskiness

2015

Psychon Bull Rev

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“…The earliest study (Dolbear and Lave 1966) concludes that risk attitudes do not affect a subject's attempt at reaching a cooperative equilibrium. Next, Raub and Snijders (1997) find that risk-averse subjects are more likely to cooperate than are non-risk-averse subjects in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game.…”

Section: Previous Literature and Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Millner and Pratt (1991) conduct a standard rent-seeking experiment in which there is uncertainty regarding whether subjects win a prize. Dolbear and Lave (1966) and Charness and Villeval (2009) include only opponentdriven uncertainty. Our Bertrand experiments also focus solely on the uncertainty resulting from actions of the other player.…”

Section: Previous Literature and Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Risk Aversion and Tacit Collusion in a Bertrand Duopoly Experiment

2012

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Recent research has found significant differences in the ability of subjects tacitly to collude, depending on the nature of the strategic interaction (e.g., Cournot vs. Bertrand or substitutes vs. complements goods). We investigate the relationship between subject-specific risk tolerance and tacit collusion in Bertrand duopoly experiments. We find that less risk-averse subjects price higher than do their more risk-averse counterparts, but this relationship is only significant when actions are strategic substitutes. When we analyze pair-level data, we find that non-risk averse subject pairs price significantly higher than do risk averse and mixed pairs in both the substitutes and complements treatments.

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“…Dolbear and Lave (1966) test participants on three different prisoner dilemma games and do not find any systematic connection with their risk preferences. Swope et al (2008) combine a prisoner's dilemma with a psychological personality test, which turns out to be insignificant.…”

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confidence: 92%

When is the risk of cooperation worth taking? The prisoner’s dilemma as a game of multiple motives

Engel

Zhurakhovska

2016

Applied Economics Letters

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Both in the field and in the lab, participants frequently cooperate, despite the fact that the situation can be modelled as a simultaneous, symmetric prisoner's dilemma. This experiment manipulates the payoff in case both players defect, and explains the degree of cooperation by a combination of five motives: the size of gains from cooperation, expectations about cooperativeness in the population in question, the degree of risk and loss aversion, and the degree by which a participant is averse to inequity. Information about these motivational forces stems from additional within subjects tests. All five factors are significant only if one controls for all the other motives, which suggests that a prisoner's dilemma is a game jointly characterised by these five motives. The need to control for the remaining explanations seems to be the reason why earlier attempts at explaining choices in the prisoner's dilemma with personality have not been successful.JEL: C72, C91, D03, H41

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Risk orientation as a predictor in the Prisoner's Dilemma

Cited by 29 publications

References 8 publications

Expectation and cooperation in prisoner’s dilemmas: The moderating role of game riskiness

Expectation and cooperation in prisoner’s dilemmas: The moderating role of game riskiness

Risk Aversion and Tacit Collusion in a Bertrand Duopoly Experiment

When is the risk of cooperation worth taking? The prisoner’s dilemma as a game of multiple motives

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