Technological conflicts are commonly seen as rooted in problems of risk perception and risk communication. This view is scriously deficicnt in that it does not fully appreciate that despite their technical content, the conflicts are at bottom political. Conflict of interests and values is evident even in differences over scientific agendas, methods, and interpretations, mid especially in the inevitable cacophony of messages describing scientific knowledge to nonexperts. Efforts to produce clear, accurate, and unbiased messages about risks will not even solve communication problems, let alone reduce conflict, because 'unbiased' is undefinable. Clear and accurate messages can always be devised to support a variety of policy positions, and they will be, whenever controversy persists. The article substantiates these points and outlines some realistic approaches to risk communication that enable nonexperts to learn through conflict what they cannot learn from carefully crafted risk messages.Over the past two decades, political debates about technological choices have frustrated many of the participants in them. Persistent acrimonious conflicts over nuclear power, hazardous chemicals, food additives, and the like have not been resolved either by accumulations of scientific evidence or expressions of public sentimcnt. In many quarters, it has bccomc fashionable to define the problem in terms of perception and communication. Many veterans of technological controversies believe that if people perceived the likely costs and benefits of the alternatives more accurately or if scientists, government agencies, and the mass media communicated more effectively about the risks, conflicts about the attendant choices would be easier to resolve and the society would be better for it. 2There are at least four serious deficiencies in this formulation. The first is a failure to appreciate fully that the conflicts are embedded in a democratic system. Technological decisions must be scientifically informed because there may be options that almost all citizens would reject if enough science were known to foresee the consequences. Nevertheless, the ultimate decision power is vested in officials answerable to the electorate. Democracy presumes that the political system embodies greater wisdom than any specialized community, even that of scientists. Democratic principles are inconsistent with a view that would give scientists or any other select group the right to determine how citizens should perceive their policy choices.The second deficiency of the fashionable view is that it treats the nature of knowledge as politically unproblematic. It assumes that risks can be assessed and the assessments explained in a value-free and politically neutral manner. lqut as the next section explains, political issues are at stake even in setting