2005
DOI: 10.1016/j.comcom.2004.10.009
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RLH: receiver driven layered hash-chaining for multicast data origin authentication

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Cited by 16 publications
(12 citation statements)
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“…In the random chaining, target packets that will carry a hash of the current packet are selected randomly. This approach complies with the random packet loss pattern [2,3,4,5,7]. In order to take advantage of both approaches, …”
Section: Main Idea Of Lmcmmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…In the random chaining, target packets that will carry a hash of the current packet are selected randomly. This approach complies with the random packet loss pattern [2,3,4,5,7]. In order to take advantage of both approaches, …”
Section: Main Idea Of Lmcmmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…It is assumed that the packets in the highest priority class are spaced evenly throughout the block so that two consecutive packets of the highest priority class are located exactly r packets apart. To reduce the communication overhead of amortization schemes, Park et al proposed SAIDA [20] using Erasure Codes to achieve this goal, but its computation overhead is higher than other schemes based on hashing amortization [1,2,3,[5][6][7][8]11,13,14,21]. …”
Section: Non-repudiationmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Another technique in [23] is based on online stream authentication, where trust is chained by sending the public key for verification of each subsequent packet. EMSS [44] and its several adaptations [14,15] reverse the above idea by sending a full-length hash of previous packets to allow for modification detection without source authentication, and a full signature for authentication at the end of the stream. However, this easily allows an adversary to forge packets until a tag is actually required, which conflicts with requirement I.…”
Section: Aggregating Packetsmentioning
confidence: 99%