Robotic Rape and Robotic Child Sexual Abuse: Should They be Criminalised?

Abstract

Soon there will be sex robots. The creation of such devices raises a host of social, legal and ethical questions. In this article, I focus in on one of them. What if these sex robots are deliberately designed and used to replicate acts of rape and child sexual abuse? Should the creation and use of such robots be criminalised, even if no person is harmed by the acts performed? I offer an argument for thinking that they should be. The argument consists of two premises. The first claims that it can be a proper object of the criminal law to regulate wrongful conduct with no extrinsically harmful effects on others (the moralistic premise). The second claims that the use (and possibly the manufacture) of robots that replicate acts of rape and child sexual abuse would be wrongful, even if such usage had no extrinsically harmful effects on others. I defend both premises of this argument and consider its implications for the criminal law. I do not offer a conclusive argument for criminalisation, nor would I wish to be interpreted as doing so; instead, I offer a tentative argument and a framework for future debate. This framework may also lead one to question the proposed rationales for criminalisation. Abstract

Me, My Bot and His Other (Robot) Woman? Keeping Your Robot Satisfied in the Age of Artificial Emotion

“…Ethical debates are increasing in quantity and diversity, the issues raised including: matters of asymmetrical affection (seen in prostitution) [83,84]; pedophilia and the spread of robots that resemble children [85]; changes in ethical dynamics when moving from masturbation and sex toys to robots [86,87]; robot rape and matters of consent [88,89]-will robots need to give consent to sex (particularly if they harbor emotions)? And, is there a danger that robots may rape humans?…”

Robot sex and consent: Is consent to sex between a robot and a human conceivable, possible, and desirable?

“…We mean a robot that looks like a human person, that has a fairly sophisticated type of artificial intelligence (AI), and that can perform various different types of functions and agency, including but not limited to sexual acts and behaviors (Cf. Danaher 2014).…”

Facsimiles of Flesh

“…If you have moral concerns about simulated violence in videogames, 17 then you're probably committed to such a principle. Likewise, you're probably committed to such a principle if you think that certain works of art can be morally problematic because of the heinous acts they depict (as claimed, e.g., in certain feminist critiques of pornography 18 ), or if you think that it would be morally problematic to have sex with a life-like robot that's designed to look like a four-year-old child, 19 or if you are convinced that telling or listening to certain jokes are morally problematic even when they don't harm others. 20 Given the second premise, the argument stands or falls on the analogy between the replica and fake meat.…”