Robotic Spacecraft Health Management

Morgan, Paula S.

doi:10.1002/9781119994053.ch34

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…A general-purpose, "Safe Mode" fault response routine is typically executed if the fault condition interferes with the onboard running sequence (along with other corrective actions performed by FP if required), which terminates the onboard running sequence, configures the spacecraft to a lower power state by powering off all nonessential spacecraft loads, commands a thermally safe attitude and safe state for the hardware, establishes a low uplink and downlink rate for earth communications, and commands the LGA antenna (to accommodate the low rates). This safe, predictable spacecraft state allows the SOFS sufficient time to evaluate the fault causes and determine a solution [6]. On Cassini, FP was implemented early in the design phase.…”

Section: Meeting Challenging Problems Through Fp and Fsw Uploadsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Robotic Autonomous Spacecraft Missions: Cassini Mission-To-Saturn Example

Morgan¹

2019

Aerospace Engineering

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Robotic interplanetary spacecraft sent to the outer planets of our solar system face many challenges: maintaining internal health and functionality of spacecraft subsystems handling material stresses from solar heating close to Earth, the cold of deep space once the destination is reached, solar radiation and bombardment of cosmic rays; maintaining adequate power to support engineering devices and science instruments; handling time-critical onboard faults in the presence of the long round-trip light time; and preserving one-time "crucial event" activities such as moon/planet flybys, deployment of the probe, and selected science targets. As an example, this chapter details the strategy implemented on the Cassini Missionto-Saturn spacecraft, how its onboard subsystems are protected and maintained, the advantage of automated onboard fault protection monitor/response routines, protocols implemented to preclude human error in uplinked sequences, and updating onboard flight software as new discoveries are uncovered about the adverse flight environment, so that mission objectives are met under the presence of an ever-increasing delay between ground issued commands and the Cassini spacecraft as it approaches the Saturnian system, safeguarding planetary protection constraints as the spacecraft was deposited into the planet in a final fiery plunge.

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Section: Meeting Challenging Problems Through Fp and Fsw Uploadsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Robotic Autonomous Spacecraft Missions: Cassini Mission-To-Saturn Example

Morgan¹

2019

Aerospace Engineering

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“…In Cassini's FP design, loss of D/L fault coverage is not protected in an "end-to-end" manner since the D/L is not considered to be a critical spacecraft function which requires autonomous restoration. But restoration of the U/L however, is considered crucial to mission success and is therefore allocated "endto-end" protection through a "Loss of Commandability" algorithm [10]. Although several other (higher priority) FP routines are installed into Cassini's FP suite to protect against these same type of failures in the U/L path (which provide more timely action), the Loss of Commandability algorithm provides a "safety net" type of FP which has the potential to restore both U/L and D/L.…”

Section: Command Loss Fpmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cassini Spacecraft-DSN Communications, Handling Anomalous Link Conditions, and Complete Loss-of-Spacecraft Signal

Morgan¹

2018

Space Flight

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Once spacecraft are launched, it is impossible for engineers to physically repair anything that breaks onboard the vehicle. Instead, remote solutions must be employed to address spacecraft anomalies and fault conditions. To achieve this goal, telemetered data from the spacecraft are collected and assess by ground personnel to resolve problems. However, if the ground-to-spacecraft communication system breaks down, or the vehicle delivers an anomalous signal, a rigorous protocol must be employed in order to re-establish or fix the telecommunications link. There are several factors that can contribute to link problems, such as malfunctions or mishandling of the ground station equipment, onboard failures of the spacecraft's flight software coding, or even mishaps caused by the space environment itself. This chapter details the anomaly recovery protocols developed for the Cassini Mission-to-Saturn project, to resolve anomalous link problems as well re-acquisition of the spacecraft should a complete Loss of Signal (LOS) condition occur.

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Cassini Mission-to-Saturn Spacecraft overview & CDS preparations for end-of-mission Proximal Orbits

Morgan

2015

2015 IEEE Aerospace Conference

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Robotic Spacecraft Health Management

Cited by 5 publications

References 5 publications

Robotic Autonomous Spacecraft Missions: Cassini Mission-To-Saturn Example

Robotic Autonomous Spacecraft Missions: Cassini Mission-To-Saturn Example

Cassini Spacecraft-DSN Communications, Handling Anomalous Link Conditions, and Complete Loss-of-Spacecraft Signal

Cassini Mission-to-Saturn Spacecraft overview & CDS preparations for end-of-mission Proximal Orbits

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Robotic Spacecraft Health Management

Cited by 5 publications

References 5 publications

Robotic Autonomous Spacecraft Missions: Cassini Mission-To-Saturn Example

Robotic Autonomous Spacecraft Missions: Cassini Mission-To-Saturn Example

Cassini Spacecraft-DSN Communications, Handling Anomalous Link Conditions, and Complete Loss-of-Spacecraft Signal

Cassini Mission-to-Saturn Spacecraft overview &amp; CDS preparations for end-of-mission Proximal Orbits

Contact Info

Product

Resources

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Cassini Mission-to-Saturn Spacecraft overview & CDS preparations for end-of-mission Proximal Orbits