2014
DOI: 10.1109/tetc.2014.2300635
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Robust and Reverse-Engineering Resilient PUF Authentication and Key-Exchange by Substring Matching

Abstract: This paper proposes novel robust and low-overhead physical unclonable function (PUF) authentication and key exchange protocols that are resilient against reverse-engineering attacks. The protocols are executed between a party with access to a physical PUF (prover) and a trusted party who has access to the PUF compact model (verifier). The proposed protocols do not follow the classic paradigm of exposing the full PUF responses or a transformation of them. Instead, random subsets of the PUF response strings are … Show more

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Cited by 146 publications
(117 citation statements)
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“…The main problems were vulnerability for DoS attacks, replay attacks, impersonation attacks, and synchronization problems. In the lightweight category of proposals are the Slender PUF, [14] noise bifurcation [15] and PUF lockdown protocol [16] retained, while in the non-lightweight category only Reference protocol II-A [13] and the protocol proposed by Sadegi et al [17]. The main difference between these protocols [13][14][15][16][17] and our PUF based protocol is that these protocols take noisiness of the PUF into account, while our protocol considers the usage of a strong and controlled PUF.…”
Section: Key Agreement From Iot Device To Servermentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The main problems were vulnerability for DoS attacks, replay attacks, impersonation attacks, and synchronization problems. In the lightweight category of proposals are the Slender PUF, [14] noise bifurcation [15] and PUF lockdown protocol [16] retained, while in the non-lightweight category only Reference protocol II-A [13] and the protocol proposed by Sadegi et al [17]. The main difference between these protocols [13][14][15][16][17] and our PUF based protocol is that these protocols take noisiness of the PUF into account, while our protocol considers the usage of a strong and controlled PUF.…”
Section: Key Agreement From Iot Device To Servermentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Moreover, Refs. [14,15] also take countermeasures to offer resistance against machine learning attacks, although they cannot be completely excluded [13]. The proposed protocol in [16] prevents an attacker from querying a token for CRPs that have not yet been disclosed during a prior protocol run.…”
Section: Key Agreement From Iot Device To Servermentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For completeness, we note the design to be inspired by the pattern matching key generator [46], which serves as an alternative for a fuzzy extractor. A protocol extension has been proposed in [49]. One presents a fourth countermeasure against modeling.…”
Section: Slender Pufs: Predecessor (May 2012) and Successor (January mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Going beyond this limited number is suggested as a countermeasure by PUF manufacturers, although they have encountered serious problems, namely the increasing number of noisy responses as well as optimization of the silicon area required on the respective chip [93]. Even in this case, physical side-channel attacks, such as photonic emission analysis, can physically characterize XOR Arbiter PUFs regardless of the number of XORs [109].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%