Robust passage phenomenology probably does not explain future-bias

Abstract

People are ‘biased toward the future’: all else being equal, we typically prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. Several explanations have been suggested for this pattern of preferences. Adjudicating among these explanations can, among other things, shed light on the rationality of future-bias: For instance, if our preferences are explained by unjustified beliefs or an illusory phenomenology, we might conclude that they are irrational. This paper investigates one hypothesis, according to which future-bias is (at least partially) explained by our having a phenomenology that we describe, or conceive of, as being as of time robustly passing. We empirically tested this hypothesis and found no evidence in its favour. Our results present a puzzle, however, when compared with the results of an earlier study. We conclude that although robust passage phenomenology on its own probably does not explain future-bias, having this phenomenology and taking it to be veridical may contribute to future-bias.

Bias towards the future

“…No study has found that beliefs about the metaphysics of time or temporal phenomenology alone contribute to future-bias. While Latham et al (2021b) found that people showed less future-bias when presented with a description of our world as lacking rather than containing robust temporal passage, people's actual beliefs about whether time passes had no discernible effect on future-bias. They hypothesised that exposure to 'moving time'/'moving ego' language might tend to elicit a certain sort of temporal phenomenology that contributes to future-bias, which would support the temporal phenomenology hypothesis.…”

“…They hypothesised that exposure to ‘moving time’/‘moving ego’ language might tend to elicit a certain sort of temporal phenomenology that contributes to future‐bias, which would support the temporal phenomenology hypothesis. But in a follow‐up study (Latham et al., 2021c), they found no association between self‐reported moving time or moving ego phenomenology and future‐bias.…”

“…Some studies provide a developmental account of these preferences (Lee et al, 2020). Others focus on determining whether these preferences are explained by the causal inaccessibility of the past (Latham et al, 2021), or by beliefs about the metaphysics of time (Latham et al, 2021a), or by our temporal phenomenology (Latham et al, 2021b). 1 In addition to work that addresses descriptive questions about the nature of future-bias, there has been significant debate regarding its rationality (Brink, 2011;Dorsey, 2018;Dougherty, 2011Dougherty, , 2015Greene & Sullivan, 2015;Hare, 2007Hare, , 2013Kauppinen, 2018;Parfit, 1984;Sullivan, 2018).…”

“…Some studies provide a developmental account of these preferences (Lee et al., 2020). Others focus on determining whether these preferences are explained by the causal inaccessibility of the past (Latham et al., 2021), or by beliefs about the metaphysics of time (Latham et al., 2021a), or by our temporal phenomenology (Latham et al., 2021b). 1…”

Why do people represent time as dynamical? An investigation of temporal dynamism and the open future

“…2 Many dynamists 3 and some non-dynamists 4 have thought that a dynamical account of time better accords with our 'ordinary' view of time. Empirical evidence suggests that many of us (at least amongst the sample of US residents tested) have a 'naïve' (i.e., pre-theoretical) representation of time that is closer to dynamical than non-dynamical (e.g., Latham et al, 2019Latham et al, , 2020aLatham et al, 2021aLatham et al, , 2021bLatham et al, , 2021cHodroj, Latham, Lee-Tory and Miller forthcoming;Baron, Everett, Latham, Miller, Tierney and Oh ms). Latham Miller and Norton (2021a, 2020a, 2020b) used detailed vignettes that described a variety of different dynamical and non-dynamical models of time, and asked participants which they think is most like our universe.…”