Robust protection scheme against cyber‐physical attacks in power systems

Giorgio, Alessandro Di; Pietrabissa, Antonio; Priscoli, Francesco Delli; Isidori, Alberto

doi:10.1049/iet-cta.2017.0725

Cited by 13 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…A first control is used in order to force the state subspace related to the zero dynamics to be a controlled invariant; then a second control is applied in order to destabilize them. The attack, originally presented in [25,26] using the machinery of geometric control theory, is formally summarized in the following using arguments similar to those reported in [118]. Consider a system of the forṁ…”

Section: Zero Dynamics and Covert Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Indeed, a scenario can be conceived in which the output of model ( 28) represents a set of variables to be protected against the spread of an attack affecting the zero dynamics. In this regard in [118] a robust defence scheme is proposed, which makes the dynamics of a selected set of power plants decoupled from the dynamics of the subsystem targeted by the attack, with the aid of an extended high-gain observer [123,124], used to robustify the control (32) in spite of inaccurate knowledge of model parameters and lack of state measurements.…”

Section: Zero Dynamics and Covert Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Review of Cyber-Physical Attacks in Smart Grids: A System-Theoretic Perspective

2021

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This paper presents a review of technical works in the field of cyber-physical attacks on the smart grid. The paper starts by discussing two reference mathematical frameworks proposed in the literature to model a smart grid under attack. Then, a review of cyber-physical attacks on the smart grid is presented, starting from works on false data injection attacks against state estimation. The aim is to present a systematic and quantitative discussion of the basic working principles of the attacks, also in terms of the inner smart grid vulnerabilities and dynamical properties exploited by the attack. The main contribution of the paper is the attempt to provide a unifying view, highlighting the fundamental aspects and the common working principles shared by the attack models, even when targeting different subsystems of the smart grid.

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Section: Zero Dynamics and Covert Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Zero Dynamics and Covert Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Review of Cyber-Physical Attacks in Smart Grids: A System-Theoretic Perspective

2021

Self Cite

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“…Denial of Service) [7][8][9]; and (iii) deception which is the corruption of signals (e.g. spoofing, false-data injection) [10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis, prevention, and feasibility assessment of stealthy ageing attacks on dynamical systems

Escudero

Massioni

Zamaï

et al. 2021

IET Control Theory & Appl

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This article provides control theory methods to analyse, prevent, and assess the feasibility of stealthy ageing attacks on controlled physical systems, modelled as dynamical systems. This new type of attacks leads to premature failures of the physical system by accelerating its ageing and remains stealthy by maintaining the system outputs as in the attack-free case. An attacker with restrained capabilities is considered: it can only corrupt the control signals transmitted to the dynamical system. This article provides set-theoretic methods to analyse and prevent these attacks by restraining the control signals in amplitude, whether the system is stable or not. The proposed methods consist in solving optimisation problems under Linear Matrix Inequality constraints. Then, a method based on linear programming is proposed to assess the feasibility of such attacks by finding the optimal attack control signals. At the end of this article, the methods are applied on two application examples to show their relevances: a thin film manufacturing and a satellite reorientation manoeuvre.

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“…In this category, the proposed methods can be further categorised into (1) protection‐based methods, (2) detection‐based methods, and (3) resilient techniques. The protection‐based approaches focus on protecting the communication links [8, 9] or a critical set of measurements [10] that provide sufficient information for solving the state estimation problem. Since the main concern of this paper is the cyber‐attack detection and secure state estimation, only the literature of categories 2 and 3 are reviewed.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Efficient resilient dynamic co‐estimation framework for cyber‐physical systems under sensor attacks

Kazemi

Safavi

Setoodeh

2020

IET Control Theory & Appl

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In this study, a novel co‐estimation approach is proposed for dynamic state estimation of cyber‐physical systems (CPSs) subjected to sensor attacks. In the proposed approach, the sensory measurements are preprocessed to extract some valuable information about the launched cyber‐attack. This information is then manipulated to form new state equations, which are augmented with the CPS model. The newly obtained model effectively represents the behaviour of both the CPS states as well as the launched cyber‐attack, and can be used for their co‐estimation. Two structures are suggested for the preprocessing of the sensory measurements that deploy Kalman filter (KF) and two‐step KF for co‐estimation of the states and cyber‐attacks. To effectively handle the concurrent effects of cyber‐attacks and unknown inputs on the CPS co‐estimation process, some auxiliary outputs are generated using high‐gain approximate differentiators to realise the required matching conditions. The proposed dynamic co‐estimation approach improves accuracy via considering the inter‐correlation between the CPS states and the cyber‐attacks. To demonstrate the viability of the proposed co‐estimation method, thorough stability and feasibility analysis are provided. Furthermore, extensive simulations are performed on a well‐known CPS‐the IEEE 14‐bus test system‐ to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.

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Robust protection scheme against cyber‐physical attacks in power systems

Cited by 13 publications

References 26 publications

Review of Cyber-Physical Attacks in Smart Grids: A System-Theoretic Perspective

Review of Cyber-Physical Attacks in Smart Grids: A System-Theoretic Perspective

Analysis, prevention, and feasibility assessment of stealthy ageing attacks on dynamical systems

Efficient resilient dynamic co‐estimation framework for cyber‐physical systems under sensor attacks

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