Robustness Analysis of Multilayer Infrastructure Networks Based on Incomplete Information Stackelberg Game: Considering Cascading Failures

Abstract

The growing importance of critical infrastructure systems (CIS) makes maintaining their normal operation against deliberate attacks such as terrorism a significant challenge. Combining game theory and complex network theory provides a framework for analyzing CIS robustness in adversarial scenarios. Most existing studies focus on single-layer networks, while CIS are better modeled as multilayer networks. Research on multilayer network games is limited, lacking methods for constructing incomplete information through link hiding and neglecting the impact of cascading failures. We propose a multilayer network Stackelberg game model with incomplete information considering cascading failures (MSGM-IICF). First, we describe the multilayer network model and define the multilayer node-weighted degree. Then, we present link hiding rules and a cascading failure model. Finally, we construct MSGM-IICF, providing methods for calculating payoff functions from the different perspectives of attackers and defenders. Experiments on synthetic and real-world networks demonstrate that link hiding improves network robustness without considering cascading failures. However, when cascading failures are considered, they become the primary factor determining network robustness. Dynamic capacity allocation enhances network robustness, while changes in dynamic costs make the network more vulnerable. The proposed method provides a new way of analyzing the robustness of diverse CIS, supporting resilient CIS design.