Robustness to strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game

Andersson, Ola; Argenton, Cédric; Weibull, Jörgen W.

doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.10.007

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…Decisions under strategic uncertainty has been studied both experimentally (Abbink and Brands, 2008;Feltowich and Swierzbinski, 2011;Andersson et al, 2018) and theoretically (Andersson et al, 2014, Yamashita, 2015. Some works, including Abbink and Brandts (2005) studied the behavior under structural uncertainty, although most of the literature focused on pure effects of the varying market structures (Plott, 1995, Camerer, 2003and Huck et al 2004…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Unlike the previous case, this situation is a coordination game, akin to Nash (1953) demand game, and yields multiple equilibria laying on the main diagonal. Existing literature (see Ochs, 1995or Crawford, 1990 suggests that human subjects in this context will coordinate on focal solutions, in case of uncertainty giving greater share to the player who is best informed (Andersson et al, 2018). Comparison of the behavior in games with single and multiple equilibria allows us to control for the effect of strategic complexity on the speed and efficiency of learning.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Adaptive learning under strategic and structural uncertainty: the case of auction games

Martinez-Saito¹,

Belianin

Шестакова³

et al. 2020

Preprint

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In games of incomplete information individual players make decisions facing a combination of structural uncertainty about the underlying parameters of the environment, and strategic uncertainty about the actions undertaken by their partners. How well are human actors able to cope with these uncertainties, and what models best describe their learning in such environments? We use a double auction task with different competitive and informational environments to characterize learning abilities of the single human participants (buyers) in a range of adaptive learning models covering reinforcement learning, directional learning and belief learning. Results show that real behaviour is best described using simple models of directional learning type with minimal knowledge assumptions about information efficiency of prices. This behavior is consistent with bounded rationality and risk aversion: human subjects try to maximize their chance for transaction, and do so using the simplest learning rule.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Adaptive learning under strategic and structural uncertainty: the case of auction games

Martinez-Saito¹,

Belianin

Шестакова³

et al. 2020

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…4 See Binmore et al (1992), Abreu and Gul (2000), or Kambe (2000). Some contributions allow for strategic uncertainty in the NDG (Binmore, 1987;Carlsson, 1991;Andersson et al, 2018). Chatterjee and Samuelson (1990) study the repeated version.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pledge-and-review bargaining

Harstad¹

2023

Journal of Economic Theory

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“…The Nash demand game (Nash (1953)) intended to implement the NBS, axiomatized by Nash (1950). There is a large subsequent literature investigating the extent to which the Nash demand game implements the NBS: see Binmore et al (1992), Abreu and Gul (2000), or Kambe (2000), and some contributions allow for uncertainty (Binmore (1987); Carlsson (1991); Andersson et al (2018)). 6…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pledge-and-Review Bargaining

Harstad

2018

SSRN Journal

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Real-world negotiations differ fundamentally from existing bargaining theory. Inspired by the Paris Agreement on climate change, this paper develops a novel bargaining game in which each party quanti.es its own contribution (to a public good, for example), before the set of pledges must be accepted. I first show that, if the tolerance for delay is uncertain, each equilibrium pledge coincides with an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. The weights placed on others. payouts reflect the underlying uncertainty, but they vary from pledge to pledge, so the set of equilibrium pledges is inefficient. This bargaining outcome is embedded in a dynamic contribution game, with endogenous technology, participation, enforcement, and contract terms, to investigate when pledge-and-review bargaining is desirable. The model's predictions can rationalize the key differences between the climate agreements signed in Kyoto (1997) and Paris (2015) as well as the development from the former to the latter.

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Robustness to strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game

Cited by 5 publications

References 19 publications

Adaptive learning under strategic and structural uncertainty: the case of auction games

Adaptive learning under strategic and structural uncertainty: the case of auction games

Pledge-and-review bargaining

Pledge-and-Review Bargaining

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