Role of Chief Executive Officers in Takeover Resistance: Effects of CEO Incentives and Individual Characteristics

Founder management and the market for corporate control for IPO firms: The moderating effect of the power structure of the firm

“…The extant corporate control literature has suggested that the loss of benefits of control motivate CEOs to adopt takeover resistance strategies even when faced with value enhancing takeover offers (Bradley et al, 1983;Jensen and Ruback, 1983;Buchholtz and Ribbens, 1994). However, there is considerable debate in the literature as to whether CEO takeover resistance strategies are beneficial or harmful to the interest of shareholders.…”

“…On the other hand, the market for corporate control has the potential to further exacerbate agency problems since the incentives of management and shareholders often diverge when faced with takeover offers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976;Walking and Long, 1984;Morck et al, 1988). As such, in the absence of effective corporate governance mechanisms that can mitigate agency problems, CEOs of target firms are more likely to adopt takeover resistance strategies motivated by self interest in order to preserve their private benefits of control (Bradley et al, 1983;DeAngelo and Rice, 1983;Jensen and Ruback, 1983;Buchholtz and Ribbens, 1994).…”

Are some entrepreneurs more overconfident than others?

“…For example, individuals' ages have been shown to affect their cognitive processes (Hagestad and Neugarten, 1985). Many past studies in the management literature have theorized about the effects of age on certain managerial decision situations, such as responses to takeover attempts (Buchholtz and Ribbens, 1994) or acquisitions (Grimm and Smith, 1991). Considerably fewer studies have examined the influence of managers' ages on their cognitive processes.…”

When CEO Career Horizon Problems Matter for Corporate Social Responsibility: The Moderating Roles of Industry-Level Discretion and Blockholder Ownership

“…From a theoretical standpoint, first of all, we extended the scope of theorizing that the upper echelons perspective prescribes. Previous research has argued that CEOs' observable attributes (e.g., age) influence firms' strategic outcomes, including R&D investment (Barker and Mueller 2002), foreign market entry (Herrmann and Datta 2002), anti-takeover provision (Buchholtz and Ribbens 1994) and so on. Our findings further suggest that the observable attributes of CEOs are also significantly related to firm's ''social'' performance, even after controlling for organizational factors identified as influential by other researchers.…”