Role of Informal Networks in Mitigating the Liability of Outsidership: Case of the Iranian Bazaar

Thornberry, Jon; Sidani, Yusuf; Apaydin, Marina

doi:10.5465/ambpp.2014.12134abstract

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…Auty (2006) suggests that in both the Caucasus and Central Asia, economic challenges and political institution construction have gone hand-in-hand with elite continuity, with institutions being remolded to suit elite interests. In a similar vein Thornberry et al (2014) discuss how important a role the informal networks of bazaaries (local merchants) and ulama (religious scholars) played in influencing the Iranian political institutional environment. Finally, it could be argued that the transitional peripheral Balkan economies of Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina have, again, faced the dual problems of chronic elite failure and resilience, with nation building become disarticulated from the confrontation of structural political problems (see Chandler, 2006).…”

Section: Institutions and The Transitional Peripherymentioning

confidence: 99%

Context, law and reinvestment decisions: Why the transitional periphery differs from other post-state socialist economies

Demirbağ

McGuinnness

Wood

et al. 2015

International Business Review

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A range of studies has found that corruption has a significant impact upon FDI decisions, however to date there has been scant investigation into longer term investments made by firms and their relative proclivity to reinvest. Further, there is particularly little work on reinvestment choices made on the transitional periphery of post-state socialist countries and how these might differ from the more stable transitional economies of central and EasternEurope. Utilising 2005 World Bank Enterprise Survey data, this study explores the relationship between corruption and MNEs' strategic decision to reinvest profits. From an institutionalist starting point, we find variation in the impact of different dimensions of corruption upon reinvestment; pervasive corruption impacts negatively upon reinvestment, but its effects are more pronounced in the transitional periphery. Perceived robust legal institutions have a positive correlation with reinvestment, but again, the negative effects are most pronounced on the transitional peripheral state socialist states. We ascribe this disparity to greater institutional fluidity, and explore why this context has particularly adverse effects.Finally, we find that firm level attributes of larger size and greater age play an important role in positive reinvestment decisions, appearing to mitigate the worst consequences of this fluidity.

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Section: Institutions and The Transitional Peripherymentioning

confidence: 99%