Role of recommendation in spatial public goods games

Imitating winner or sympathizing loser? Quadratic effects on cooperative behavior in prisoners’ dilemma games

“…After that, they calculate and compare payoffs of eight neighbors. Each agent adopts the neighbor with lowest payoff (loser) with the probability p, and imitates the neighbor with highest payoff (winner) with the probability 1 − p. Then, the second round of game begins and agents follow exactly the Besides, although the learning mechanism is widely applied in related studies [13,15,16,20,25,26,28,31,32], we prefer not to use it for now as it tends to mix the effect of learning with that of sympathy and therefore leads to unnecessary complexity.…”

“…So far series of anti-temptation mechanisms are proposed to overcome temptation and promote cooperation, such as reputation [3,5,7,8,12,23,24], tolerance [32], punishment [21,29,32], recommendation [25], influence [28], values [37,38], emotion [2], altruism [11,39], expectation [10,34], commitment [39], and voluntarism [30,36,40]. Therefore, as the quadratic effect of sympathy on cooperation is clear, the next priority is to check whether sympathy is an effective anti-temptation mechanism or not.…”

“…Therefore, mechanisms that are able to overcome temptation are needed to promote cooperation. Varieties of anti-temptation mechanisms are proposed, such as reputation [3,5,7,8,12,23,24], influence [28], tolerance [32], punishment [21,29,32,33], recommendation [25], and expectation [10,34]. It suggests that they all enhance cooperation at certain extents.…”

Social Stratification and Cooperative Behavior in Spatial Prisoners' Dilemma Games

“…However, the traditional game induces two challenges [ 22 – 24 ]: first, agents are subjective, not repeating actions mechanically and randomly. They have memory [ 8 , 12 , 22 , 24 ], trust [ 2 , 7 , 8 , 10 , 11 , 25 – 28 ], expectation [ 29 ], altruism [ 13 , 16 ], volunteerism [ 19 ], recommendation [ 14 ], prestige and reputation [ 4 , 6 , 7 , 12 , 19 , 23 , 28 – 30 ]. It indicates that cooperation can be promoted based on these subjective factors; second, homogeneity should be denied, and heterogeneity is supposed to be introduced [ 11 , 20 , 25 ], such as group diversity [ 8 , 23 , 31 ], social structure [ 26 ], and network [ 26 , 31 ].…”

Individual choice and reputation distribution of cooperative behaviors among heterogeneous groups

“…They have raised serials of anti-temptation mechanisms or solutions, such as influence [28], recommendation [25], tolerance [32], expectation [10,34], punishment [21,29,32,35], reciprocity [35][36][37][38][39], networks [40][41][42][43][44][45][46], structured population [47][48][49][50], multiplex network [51][52][53] and volunteering [54][55][56][57], etc. It suggests that they all enhance cooperation under specific circumstances.…”