2015
DOI: 10.1017/psrm.2015.8
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Rooting Out Corruption or Rooting for Corruption? The Heterogeneous Electoral Consequences of Scandals

Abstract: Corruption scandals have been found to have significant but mild electoral effects in the comparative literature (Golden 2006). However, most studies have assumed that voters punish all kinds of illegal practices. This article challenges this assumption by distinguishing between two types of corruption, according to the type of welfare consequences they have for the constituency. This hypothesis is tested using data from the 2011 Spanish local elections. We exploit the abundance of corruption allegations assoc… Show more

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Cited by 93 publications
(79 citation statements)
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“…Numerous factors are mentioned as potential sources for this variance in voters' responses. Voters may respond differently to different types of scandals (Bhatti et al, 2013;Carlson et al, 2000;Doherty et al, 2011;Fernández-Vázquez et al, 2016). Thompson (2013) distinguishes three types of scandals, namely sex scandals, financial fraud scandals, and corruption scandals.…”
Section: Heterogeneous Responses To Politicians' Moral Transgressionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Numerous factors are mentioned as potential sources for this variance in voters' responses. Voters may respond differently to different types of scandals (Bhatti et al, 2013;Carlson et al, 2000;Doherty et al, 2011;Fernández-Vázquez et al, 2016). Thompson (2013) distinguishes three types of scandals, namely sex scandals, financial fraud scandals, and corruption scandals.…”
Section: Heterogeneous Responses To Politicians' Moral Transgressionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Collective action theories point to the importance of norms of reciprocity, reputation, and trust, where individual action is at least partly influenced by expectations about how other individuals will act (Aumann and Dreze 2008;Fehr and Fischbacher 2005;Gintis et al 2005;Ostrom 1998;Sen 1967). Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell (2013) suggest that citizens that expect most fellow citizens, as well as monitoring devices and punishment regimes, to be corrupt will be more willing to perpetuate corruption.…”
Section: Cooperation or "Free Riding"?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, voters may prioritize factors other than corruption, such as the economy (see, e.g., Choi and Woo 2010;Casey 2014;Konstantinidis and Xezonakis 2013;Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga 2013). Moreover, voters may benefit from some corrupt acts and as a result actively endorse the politicians that pursue them, for example, in the form of clientelism or other types of personal gains (Fernández-Vásquez et al 2016;Manzetti and Wilson 2007). Third, some scholars focus on political institutions and how they affect the possibilities for voters to hold politicians accountable.…”
Section: Literature Review Theory and Hypothesesmentioning
confidence: 99%