Round 3: Regarding Objectivity and Causality -- A Rejoinder to Fishman and Miller

Abstract

In this rejoinder I respond separately to Daniel Fishman's and Ronald B. Miller's respective arguments regarding my views about objectivity and causality, owing to the fact that Fishman finds a place for "objectivity" and "causality" within his theoretical model whereas Miller does not. First, I question the basis for Fishman's conclusion that coherence and pragmatic models are objectivist according to my definition of an objectivist epistemology. I also challenge his claim to have included "causal mechanisms" in his pragmatic system of therapy, since he gives them no ontological status other than that of "conceptual tools." Second, I challenge Miller's claim that clinical knowledge cannot be objective knowledge because it is moral knowledge in which what one observes is allegedly determined by one's moral perspective. I also question his insistence that causal explanation in the physical world so departs from causal explanation in the human world that the word "cause" cannot be used in the latter without causing confusion. But if that is so, then the moral accountability and repair that Miller seeks in clinical practice may be hard to obtain.

The Logic of Case-Study Methodology

“…Although applying the theory to the case takes a first step in understanding the case, the point of the research is to apply case observations to the theory, to evaluate and improve it. (p. 10) This sounds reasonable to me (see Held, 2006aHeld, , 2006b), but questions emerge nonetheless.…”

“…However, from my reading of Stiles, Fishman, and Miller, I believe it holds considerable promise (Held, 2006a(Held, , 2006b). Nonetheless, I also believe that, like all methodologies, it could surely benefit from clear explication of its own conceptual and philosophical underpinnings, including the logical operations discussed by Stiles in the creation, alteration, evaluation/justification, and application of psychotherapeutic theories.…”

Round 4B: How Real Is Clinical Wisdom? A Further Reply to Held

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ABSTRACT Held (2006a;2006b) has critiqued my position (Miller, 2004; Miller, 2006a) that the centrality of suffering to clinical practice in psychology makes moral concerns also inherent in, and central to, clinical judgment and practice. Held does not deny the importance of basic human suffering or moral concerns to the clinical situation.

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“…I shall confine myself again to those portions of the Held (2006b) paper in question that directly comment on my views on the nature of clinical knowledge and clinical research. I believe that I am correct in asserting that Barbara Held and I share a deep commitment to developing a discipline of clinical psychology that requires us to be guided by reason, emotional integrity, evidence, and a moral commitment to attempt to alleviate human suffering.…”

Finding Legitimacy for Case Study Knowledge: Introduction to a Trialogue in 4 Rounds

“…[T]he justification for clinical actions (assessment and therapeutic practices) must involve moral principles or arguments about the fundamental meaning of moral terms like good and bad, right and wrong, respect and dignity, freedom and responsibility. Such definitions are not purely descriptive, but prescriptive and value laden (Miller, 2006a, p. 2 Round 3, part 1 (Held [2006b] on Fishman [2006a]). In responding to me in round 3, Held reiterates and expands upon the philosophical justification for psychology to focus on objectivity, that is, statements about theory and causal mechanisms that in my view adhere to the correspondence theory of truth.…”