Rousseau and the minimal self: A solution to the problem of <i>amour-propre</i>

McLendon, Michael Locke

doi:10.1177/1474885113492504

Cited by 8 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…It is also to amour‐propre, as the Second Discourse claims, “that we owe what is best (…) amongst men” (DI 184). In addition, it also provides the key impulse to solve the problems that its inflammation creates (Dent, 2006; McLendon, 2014; Neuhouser, 2008). As a consequence, I contend that, properly channeled, amour‐propre can provide the mechanism for a virtuous process of valuation.…”

Section: Assessing the “Real” Worth Of Menmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rousseau's theory of value and the case of women

Rousselière

2021

European J of Philosophy

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In Emile, Rousseau claims that the value of women ought to be determined by the opinion that men have of them. Women, contrary to commodities and men, escape what I call Rousseau's “dual theory of value.” According to the latter, the apparent value of commodities and men is determined by opinion and either unrelated or inverse to “real value,” which is assessed through objective criteria. The dual theory of value is the basis of Rousseau's critique of commercial society. However, women warrant an exception to this theory. As women's apparent worth is their real worth, women are the unique object in the world that ought to be subjected to the rule of opinion, which is the rule of commercial market that Rousseau so violently rejects. This article investigates why this is the case and locates three functions to the unique position of women in Rousseau's theory of value.

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Section: Assessing the “Real” Worth Of Menmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rousseau's theory of value and the case of women

Rousselière

2021

European J of Philosophy

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“…This attitude, Locke McLendon argues, leads to a devaluation of achievements in other spheres of life-such as parenting or care-giving-no matter how morally valuable these achievements may be (2003: 116). Unless our cultural attitudes do not change, other spheres of life cannot easily function as equivalent, alternative sources of esteem and self-esteem (Locke McLendon 2014: 354-55, 2018. This is why liberal societies based on merit systems of distributive justice will be 'most likely to suffer from an excess of amour-propre ' (Locke McLendon 2003: 128).…”

Section: Rousseau's Challengementioning

confidence: 99%

D’Holbach on (Dis-)Esteeming Talent

Blank

2020

Journal of Modern Philosophy

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Rousseau argues that holding the talented in high public esteem leads the less talented to esteem their natural virtues less highly and therefore to neglect the cultivation of these virtues. D'Holbach's response to Rousseau indicates a sense in which esteeming talent can avoid these detrimental consequences. The starting point of d'Holbach's defense of the sciences and arts is an analysis of the impact that despotic regimes have on esteeming talent. He argues that there is not only a problem of over-valuing talent but also a problem of under-valuing talent. These considerations form the background for his conception of valuing talent in the right way. The phenomenon of political deception in despotic regimes indicates a sense in which talent can be regarded as a tool for solving a pressing political problem: Genuinely estimable uses of talent are those that oppose despotism and support republican virtues. Esteeming such talent does not lead to a loss of esteem and self-esteem for ordinary people because republican virtues themselves are a source of esteem and self-esteem. Comparison with some aspects of the response of d'Holbach's friend, Claude-Adrien Helvétius, to Rousseau will accentuate the specific strengths of d'Holbach's argument.

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“…See Dent (1988), pp. 20–21, 52–58; Neuhouser (2008) chapters 1–5; McLendon (2014), Cooper (1999), O’Hagan (1999: 162–179).…”

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confidence: 99%

Emile the citizen? A reassessment of the relationship between private education and citizenship in Rousseau’s political thought

Gomes

2015

European Journal of Political Theory

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It is often said that the claims of man and citizen are irreconcilable in the philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. This view, most famously articulated by Judith Shklar, holds that the making of a man and the making of a citizen are to be understood as rival enterprises or competing alternatives. This reading has recently been challenged by Frederick Neuhouser. He argues that one can make a man and a citizen, but only if the education of each is performed in the absence of the other. In his view, Emile is raised to be a man first (Books I-IV) before his subsequent instruction in citizenship (Book V). This paper challenges both views. I argue that the making of man and citizen are, in principle, neither rival enterprises nor competing alternatives, and that although Neuhouser is indeed correct to argue for a successive system of education, the making of a citizen is not completed in Emile, but extends into the Social Contract. His account diminishes the crucial role the Lawgiver plays in the fashioning of citizens capable of discerning the general will. I show that although raising individuals under a system of private instruction does not preclude their transformation into citizens but makes such a transformation possible, it is on its own incapable of making citizens.

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Rousseau and the minimal self: A solution to the problem of amour-propre

Cited by 8 publications

References 14 publications

Rousseau's theory of value and the case of women

Rousseau's theory of value and the case of women

D’Holbach on (Dis-)Esteeming Talent

Emile the citizen? A reassessment of the relationship between private education and citizenship in Rousseau’s political thought

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