2017
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_19
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Routing Games over Time with FIFO Policy

Abstract: We study atomic routing games where every agent travels both along its decided edges and through time. The agents arriving on an edge are first lined up in a first-in-first-out queue and may wait: an edge is associated with a capacity, which defines how many agents-pertime-step can pop from the queue's head and enter the edge, to transit for a fixed delay. We show that the best-response optimization problem is not approximable, and that deciding the existence of a Nash equilibrium is complete for the second le… Show more

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Cited by 22 publications
(17 citation statements)
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“…Such computability is in sharp contrast with previous hardness results on related games of atomic dynamic flows, e.g., NP-completeness for determining NE existence (Werth et al 2014) and NPhardness for computing a best response (Hoefer et al 2009, Ismaili 2017.…”
Section: Contributionscontrasting
confidence: 75%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Such computability is in sharp contrast with previous hardness results on related games of atomic dynamic flows, e.g., NP-completeness for determining NE existence (Werth et al 2014) and NPhardness for computing a best response (Hoefer et al 2009, Ismaili 2017.…”
Section: Contributionscontrasting
confidence: 75%
“…The paradox differs from ours in that it involves route changes (see Section 4.2). Under the model of Scarsini et al (2018), Ismaili (2017) shows many negative results when multiple origin-destination pairs are involved, including non-existence of an NE, and the NP-hardness and inapproximability of computing a best response, etc.…”
Section: Atomic Dynamic Flow Gamesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Our results reveal that this is in fact not true: there are multi-commodity instances with finitely lasting bounded inflows that admit IDE flows cycling forever. For the discrete version of this model using the natural discrete version of our equi-librium concept, such a behavior was already discovered in Ismaili [12,Theorem 8], though his instance makes critical use of edges with zero transit time (which we do not allow) and the instantaneous travel time always increases when there is positive inflow into an edge, even when the edge inflow rate is smaller than the rate capacity. In particular, players may observe increased instantaneous travel time, although no player is in fact delayed.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 91%
“…Since all edges vw i are active at time θ k , we have v (θ k ) = c vw i (θ k ) + w i (θ k ) and, thus, a flow with constant inflow rates satisfies (12) and (13)…”
Section: Existence Of Ide Flows In Single-sink Networkmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For multi-commodity games pure Nash equilibria do not exist in general. This follows from the example presented by Ismaili [14], which we adapt to our model here. Proposition 2.1.…”
Section: Competitive Packet Routing Gamementioning
confidence: 99%