Rule-following, ideal conditions and finkish dispositions

Guardo, Andrea

doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9632-y

Cited by 9 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…29. What follows improves on the argument of Guardo (2012). For somewhat analogous remarks see also Boghossian (2015).…”

Section: Idealsupporting

confidence: 70%

Yet Another Victim of Kripkenstein’s Monster: Dispositions, Meaning, and Privilege

Guardo

2022

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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In metasemantics, semantic dispositionalism is the view that what makes it the case that, given the value of the relevant parameters, a certain linguistic expression refers to what it does are the speakers’ dispositions. In the literature, there is something like a consensus that the fate of dispositionalism hinges on the status of three arguments, first put forward by Saul Kripke—or at least usually ascribed to him. This paper discusses a different, and strangely neglected, anti-dispositionalist argument, which develops some remarks first put forward by Paul Boghossian and Anandi Hattiangadi and revolves around the idea that semantic dispositionalists have no way to justify their privileging certain dispositions, the ones they take to be reference-determining, over all the others. After some background (Section 1) and a first presentation of the argument (Section 2), I discuss three ways a dispositionalist might try to answer it and find them all wanting (Section 3).

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“…29. What follows improves on the argument of Guardo (2012). For somewhat analogous remarks see also Boghossian (2015).…”

Section: Idealsupporting

confidence: 70%

Yet Another Victim of Kripkenstein’s Monster: Dispositions, Meaning, and Privilege

Guardo

2022

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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“…For example, seeCohen and Handfield (2007),Handfield and Bird (2008), Cheng (2010),Schlosser (2011),Guardo (2012),Choi (2013),Ashwell (2014),Ruben (2016),Mantel (2017),Bird (manuscript).434Sungho Choi © 2019 The Author dialectica © 2019 Editorial Board of dialectica…”

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confidence: 99%

Reverse‐Cycle Intrinsic Finks

Choi

2019

Dialectica

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There is an ongoing debate among metaphysicians of dispositions about whether intrinsic interferers are possible for dispositions. What is interesting about this debate is that, whilst it is widely noted that dispositional interferers can work on a 'reverse' cycle, the possibility of reverse-cycle intrinsic interferers has been put on the sidelines with all the attention being paid to the possibility of their 'normal' cousins. Presumably this is due to the perception that a discussion of reverse-cycle interferers will be a trivial repetition of a discussion of normal ones. But I will argue that this perception is wrong. Whilst I acknowledge that there is a significant symmetry between the possibility of normal interferers and that of reverse-cycle ones, it is not a trivial task to give an account of intrinsic interferers in a way that accommodates this symmetry. In fact, when we examine the justifications the participants in this debate have offered for their positions, it will emerge that they are all under pressure to reject the possibility of reverse-cycle intrinsic interferers. What is intriguing about this result is that what advocates of the possibility of normal intrinsic interferers have said in support of that possibility, rather unexpectedly, puts pressure on them to reject the possibility of reverse-cycle intrinsic interferers. Combined with the symmetry between the possibility of normal interferers and that of reverse-cycle ones, this will pose a serious challenge to them.

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“…The “optimal” terminology is used by Boghossian (), the “ideal” terminology by Guardo (), and the “normal” terminology by Shogenji (). My reasons for preferring the last will soon be made clear.…”

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confidence: 99%

Killing Kripkenstein's Monster

Warren

2018

Nous

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For over thirty years a monster has lumbered through the philosophical landscape laying waste to naturalistic, broadly dispositional approaches to rule-following, meaning, and content. The monster is terrifying; the mere mention of his name is often enough to inspire retreat. If the forces of naturalism are ultimately to prevail, Kripkenstein's monster must be killed, once and for all. Here I attempt this dangerous and perhaps foolhardy task. But why now? Couldn't the monster have been killed back in the eighties? In principle: yes. But in reality: perhaps not. Many attacks were launched, and while some did significant damage, none fully succeeded. Additionally, several adventurers have rallied to the monster's cause in the intervening years, bolstering his already formidable attacks. And let us not dwell on the many raiding parties forever lost in the bog of Wittgenstein exegesis surrounding the monster's lair.Fantastical analogies aside, here I defend dispositionalism in the face of Kripke's influential anti-dispositionalist arguments in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. 1 Leaving aside both Wittgenstein exegesis and the "sceptical" solution, I will focus only on showing how dispositionalism, broadly construed, withstands Kripke's attacks. Two of Kripke's arguments-those concerning finitude and error-purport to show that dispositionalism has problems extensionally accounting for the meanings we deploy and the rules that we follow, while the third-that concerning normativity-purports to show that even if the extensional challenge is met, dispositionalism cannot hope to account for the normativity involved in meaning and rule-following.

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Rule-following, ideal conditions and finkish dispositions

Cited by 9 publications

References 24 publications

Yet Another Victim of Kripkenstein’s Monster: Dispositions, Meaning, and Privilege

Yet Another Victim of Kripkenstein’s Monster: Dispositions, Meaning, and Privilege

Reverse‐Cycle Intrinsic Finks

Killing Kripkenstein's Monster

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