Rule of Law, Regulation and Growth of Mobile Telecommunications

The case study in telecommunications policy research

“…Celtel, Etisalat, MTN, TeliaSonera and Vodafone). A study relating the growth of mobile teledensities in 2002 with the rule of law (Candeub et al , 2009) was problematic, given the uncertainty over the accuracy of teledensities in any one year and the difficulties in excluding other factors (e.g. new licenses and technologies).…”

Dealing with politics for money and power in infrastructure

“…Relevant examples are Nigeria, Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, Iran and Angola. Tendencies of patronage and 23 For example, without questioning the impressive achievement of the Brazilian government in the management of water resources under the Lula administrations, it is hard to forget that a politician considered for the position of Secretary in charge of water policies initially suggested that prices should be driven mostly by willingness and ability to pay, without concern for costs. In other words, subsidies and hence taxpayers would pick up a tab driven mainly by price consultations.…”

“…Subsidies and price regulations may benefit consumers if required to strengthen support among the 29 The opposite may also hold, according to Murillo and Martinez-Gallardo (2007). 30 Candeub, Cunningham, and Alexander (2008), for example, find that non-democratic regimes with relatively low protection of property rights may well experience mobile network growth, as long as some minimum regulations are in place regarding tariffs, import controls and level of foreign ownership restrictions. 31 See Adenikinju (2005) for a case study of how political dominance in regulation may challenge electricity provision under "club leadership."…”

“…23 Severe inefficiencies in sector performance can be hidden behind consumption subsidies. 24 If the electorate is sufficiently myopic or ignorant about the subsequent long-term inefficiencies and fiscal cost when voting, the subsidy strategy may increase politicians' chances of getting reelected.…”

Infrastructure Policy and Governance Failures

“…30 When political parties with different ideologies seem to agree on ownership and other aspects of infrastructure politics, conservative and nonconservative parties are found to behave differently, depending on what party is in power -see López-de-Silanes et al, 1997. 31 Candeub, Cunningham, and Alexander (2008), for example, find that non-democratic regimes with relatively low protection of property rights may well experience mobile network growth, as long as some minimum regulations are in place regarding tariffs, import controls and level of foreign ownership restrictions. competition between fixed and mobile services, which offer consumers different options.…”