Rules versus Discretion in Public Service: Teacher Hiring in Mexico

Abstract

In this paper, I use a unique empirical setting that allows me to compare the performance of teachers hired in a discretionary process led by the teachers' union in Mexico with the performance of those hired on the basis of a screening rule (test scores on a standardized exam). My results show that the discretionary hires perform considerably worse than the rulebased hires (as measured by value added to student achievement). The evidence presented here shows the impact of personnel selection mechanisms on the quality of public service delivery.Small sections of text, that are less than two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission as long as this document is stated. Findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this publication are the sole responsibility of its author(s), and it cannot be, in any way, attributed to CAF, its Executive Directors or the countries they represent. CAF does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and is not, in any way, responsible for any consequences resulting from its use. RULES VS. DISCRETION IN PUBLIC SERVICE: TEACHER HIRING IN MEXICO REGLAS VS DISCRECIÓN EN EL SERVICIO PÚBLICO: SELECCIÓN DE DOCENTES EN MÉXICO Estrada, R. CAF -Documento de trabajo N° 2017/11 08/2017RESUMEN En este estudio, utilizo un contexto empírico único que me permite comparar el desempeño de docentes seleccionados en un proceso discrecional liderado por el sindicato de maestros en México con el de docentes seleccionados en un concurso basado en un examen estandarizado. Mis resultados muestran que los docentes seleccionados mediante el método discrecional tienen un desempeño considerablemente menor que el de los docentes seleccionados mediante el concurso (midiendo desempeño como el valor agregado al logro académico de los estudiantes). La evidencia presentada en este estudio revela la importancia de los métodos de selección de personal para la calidad de los servicios públicos.Small sections of text, that are less than two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission as long as this document is stated. Findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this publication are the sole responsibility of its author(s), and it cannot be, in any way, attributed to CAF, its Executive Directors or the countries they represent. CAF does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and is not, in any way, responsible for any consequences resulting from its use. AbstractIn this paper, I use a unique empirical setting that allows me to compare the performance of teachers hired in a discretionary process led by the teachers' union in Mexico with the performance of those hired on the basis of a screening rule (test scores on a standardized exam). My results show that the discretionary hires perform considerably worse than the rule-based hires (as measured by value added to student achievement). The evidence presented here shows the impact of personnel selection mechanisms on the quality of public service delivery. JEL: I21, J51, M51.

Managers' Productivity and Recruitment in the Public Sector

“…Recent literature has shown that patronage is a common feature in public sector appointments (Xu, 2018;Akhtari et al, 2018;Colonnelli et al, 2020;Voth and Xu, 2019), with mixed findings regarding its effects on state capacity. 3 More related to our work, Estrada (2019) studies the effect of decreasing the share of teachers hired under discretion and finds that it has a positive effect on school level outcomes. Likewise, Scot et al (2020) show that civil service examinations can be an effective way to screen state judge candidates in Brazil, and Moreira and Pérez (2021) show that performance-based hiring for US bureaucrats led to less turnover and better quality workers (although it had no effect on performance).…”

Teacher Compensation and Structural Inequality: Evidence from Centralized Teacher School Choice in Perú

“…To better understand the reasons behind the allocation of teachers across different geographic areas, we now describe the institutions surrounding the labor 9 Competency is assessed by teachers' performance on the curricular and pedagogical knowledge module of the standardized test used to both screen and recruit teachers (see Section 3.2). Subject competency test have shown to correlate with teacher value added and other dimensions of teacher quality in several contexts (Bold et al, 2017;Estrada, 2019;Gallegos et al, 2019;Araujo et al, 2020). In Perú in particular, Bertoni et al (2021) document strong correlations between various measures of teaching effectiveness and the score in the curricular and pedagogical knowledge module of the evaluation test.…”

“…12 The recruitment process of permanent and contract teachers in Perú was decentralized until 2015. As in most countries, regional and local level officials often had significant discretion in teacher hiring and allocation decisions (Bertoni et al, 2019;Estrada, 2019). In an effort to make the process more transparent and meritocratic, the Ministry of Education established a nation-wide recruitment process in which school-level job postings and teacher job applications are processed on a single, centrally-managed platform.…”

Promoting Parental Involvement in Schools: Evidence from Two Randomized Experiments

“…It is also worth noting the strength of teacher unions in Mexico, which ensures considerable job security in the profession (Estrada, 2019;Santibanez, 2006). Given that the majority of teachers in public schools are unionized, there may be little incentive for teachers to directly respond to parental demands.…”