Ruling Elites' Rotation and Asset Ownership: Implications for Property Rights

Polishchuk, Leonid; Syunyaev, Georgiy

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2369317

Cited by 1 publication

(3 citation statements)

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“…This empirical strategy assumes that random exits cause political instability, making successors less confident about their hold on power and hence more amenable to putting restrictions on expropriation. Polishchuk and Syunyaev (2015) arrive to a similar conclusion by positing that incumbent rulers form expectation about their political survival based on the recent history, and by relating the quality of property rights protection to the actual rate of power shifts over a preceding period (see also the model below in this chapter). They demonstrate that in non-democracies elites' rotation has positive and statistically significant impact on property rights.…”

Section: Importance Of (Not) Being Stationarymentioning

confidence: 94%

“…4 Similar assumptions are made in Besley and Persson (2011) and Besley et al (2012). 5 Polishchuk and Syunyaev's (2015) model power shifts by a continuous Poisson process, and assumes a distributed lag in institutional changes. 6 Concavity implies risk-aversion and hence the reluctance to accept sharp income fluctuations caused by power shifts.…”

Section: Concluding Commentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…7 In addition the marginal utility of expropriation diminishes in the incumbent elite's wealth, which makes a wealthy group less interested in expropriation. 8 This section relies on Polishchuk and Syunyaev (2015). 9 The second indicator was included due to the key role of independent judiciary in the security of property rights.…”

Section: Concluding Commentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Elites, Institutions and the Quality of Government

Dahlström¹,

Wängnerud²

2015

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The Executive Politics and Governance series focuses on central government, its organisation and its instruments. It is particularly concerned with how the changing conditions of contemporary governing affect perennial questions in political science and public administration. Executive Politics and Governance is therefore centrally interested in questions such as how politics interacts with bureaucracies, how issues rise and fall on political agendas, and how public organisations and services are designed and operated. This book series encourages a closer engagement with the role of politics in shaping executive structures, and how administration shapes politics and policy-making. In addition, this series also wishes to engage with the scholarship that focuses on the organisational aspects of politics, such as government formation and legislative institutions.The series welcomes high-quality research-led monographs with comparative appeal. Edited volumes that provide in-depth analysis and critical insights into the field of Executive Politics and Governance are also encouraged.Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataElites, institutions and the quality of government / edited by Carl Dahlström, Associate Professor, University of Gothenburg, Sweden ; Lena Wängnerud, Professor, University of Gothenburg, Sweden. pages cm. -(Executive politics and governance) Includes bibliographical references. Summary: "Elite politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen hold the fortunes of societies in their hands not only because of their direct influence on politics, administration and economy but also since their behavior indirectly signals how things are done. How are elites persuaded not to use their privileged position to enrich themselves at the expense of the society at large? The answer from research, so far, is through formal and informal institutional constraints, which in different ways alter incentives at the top. This edited volume contributes to the knowledge of the interaction between elites, institutions and other constraints and how this affects corruption and other forms of bad government. It problematizes the incentives for elites and masses to fight grand and petty corruption, respectively, and demonstrates the importance of elite constraints for good societies, where infant mortality is low and life expectancy and satisfaction are high. It also explores the behavior of a largely unconstrained elite group, namely the diplomatic corps, and shows how corru...

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Section: Importance Of (Not) Being Stationarymentioning

confidence: 94%

Section: Concluding Commentsmentioning

confidence: 99%