2023
DOI: 10.1007/s10693-023-00412-8
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Running Out of Bank Runs

Abstract: The theoretical literature on bank runs has modeled depositors’ withdrawal decision as a one-off choice, made simultaneously by all depositors. Our game-theoretic framework gives depositors a heterogeneous, stochastic opportunity to change their minds about withdrawing their money. They can run out of (or run into) the crowd in front of the bank based on their observation of what others have done. Depositors’ opportunity to change their decision supports implicit coordination, which in some circumstances reduc… Show more

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Cited by 2 publications
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