2016
DOI: 10.1080/13569775.2016.1201316
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Russia and ‘hybrid warfare’

Abstract: A note on versions:The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher's version. Please see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that access may require a subscription.For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk

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Cited by 80 publications
(30 citation statements)
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“…Previous research has sought to provide a clearer picture by studying the threat, focusing directly on practices: cases of disinformation, (antagonistic) strategic narratives and fake news (e.g. Mejias andVokuev 2017, Ziegler 2018), or the practice of "information warfare" (Baumann 2020) or "hybrid warfare" (Jonson and Seeley 2015, Renz 2016). We instead propose a bottom-up approach, focusing on threat perceptions in a democratic society.…”
Section: How To Grasp the Problem With Projection Of Harmful Informatmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Previous research has sought to provide a clearer picture by studying the threat, focusing directly on practices: cases of disinformation, (antagonistic) strategic narratives and fake news (e.g. Mejias andVokuev 2017, Ziegler 2018), or the practice of "information warfare" (Baumann 2020) or "hybrid warfare" (Jonson and Seeley 2015, Renz 2016). We instead propose a bottom-up approach, focusing on threat perceptions in a democratic society.…”
Section: How To Grasp the Problem With Projection Of Harmful Informatmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Enkelte har på bakgrunn av begivenhetene som ledet fram mot den russiske annekteringen av Krimhalvøya, og dessuten Gerasimovs artikkel, konkludert at hybridkrig er et framtredende aspekt ved russisk konflikthåndtering. 4 Det faktum at Gerasimov i sin artikkel, og i foredraget den var basert på, faktisk beskrev det han oppfattet som vestlig bruk av hybride virkemidler og at det russiske forsvaret var dårlig forberedt på å møte denne nye trusselen fra vest, underkommuniseres (Renz 2016;Bartles 2016). De fleste elementene som beskrives som «hybride» er kjente fra før.…”
Section: Trusselbilderunclassified
“…(Snegovaya, 2015) However, Gerasimov's emphasis on non-military tools was aimed at describing the primary threats to Russian sovereignty, which had stemmed from the perceived US-funded social and political movements, such as color revolutions and the Arab Spring (Bartles, 2016). One of Gerasimov's central messages was to reproach Russian military leaders for not keeping up with contemporary strategic thought and for being in danger of falling behind the West, rather than laying the foundation for a new military approach (Renz, 2016).…”
Section: Abstract: Hybrid Warfare Content Analysis Russia-ukraine mentioning
confidence: 99%