2015
DOI: 10.1080/14683857.2015.1060018
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Russia–EU relations at a crossroads: preventing a new Cold War in a polycentric world

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Cited by 4 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…Especially the Ukraine crisis and shady prospects of further eastward enlargement had a mobilizing effect on EU-wide debates about the future position of the European Union in international politics (see Cadier 2018; David and Romanova 2015; Haukkala 2015). Discourses were periodically dominated by narrations about an inevitable 'new Cold War' between an emerging EU/NATO/USA bloc and Russia (Browning 2018;Gromyko 2015;Monaghan 2015). Associated narratives tacitly or outspokenly required that everyone took a stance.…”
Section: Crisis Dynamism As a Trigger Of Euroscepticismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Especially the Ukraine crisis and shady prospects of further eastward enlargement had a mobilizing effect on EU-wide debates about the future position of the European Union in international politics (see Cadier 2018; David and Romanova 2015; Haukkala 2015). Discourses were periodically dominated by narrations about an inevitable 'new Cold War' between an emerging EU/NATO/USA bloc and Russia (Browning 2018;Gromyko 2015;Monaghan 2015). Associated narratives tacitly or outspokenly required that everyone took a stance.…”
Section: Crisis Dynamism As a Trigger Of Euroscepticismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The overt anti-Russian discourse of the CEE member states has perpetuated the deep division within the EU as how to respond to Russia. At the same time, rather than making Europe more secure, the conflictual approach the CEE member states has made Russia increasingly weary of the EU and the way in seeks to outsource its security needs to NATO (Gromyko 2015).…”
Section: Space Constraints Do Not Allow a Review Of Way The Individuamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, during the coloured revolutions Moscow was not strong enough to take decisive action against the EU's 'intrusion' in the eastern neighbourhood; this made the EU think that its approach in the region was not seen by Russia as a security threat (Haukkala 2010b). In reality, Russia perceived the coloured revolutions as a battle in its strategic competition with the West, criticising the latter's interventionism (Gromyko 2015). The tension was made even more acute following the Georgian-Russian war of 2008 when European policymakers came to the conclusion that Russia was interested only in the security of the post-Soviet space, and that it did not view the economic order of the region as a threat to its vital security interests (Larsen 2012); however, the Kremlin understood the situation in the completely opposite way (Snetkov 2014).…”
Section: The Geopolitical Tension: the Eu's Expansion In The Post-sovmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Misperception of Russian attitudes towards the EU's policies in the post-Soviet space has remained a constant in Europe. For example, in the beginning of the crisis, the EU failed to understand that the Maidan protests and the exclusive character of the Association Agreement offered to Ukraine made Moscow deeply disillusioned with the EU's integration project (Gromyko, 2015). Misperceptions can be partly attributed to the lack of expertise on Russia and the post-Soviet states found in many EU capitals.…”
Section: Eu Foreign Policymentioning
confidence: 99%